St. Rose of Lima - The Hermit

 

CHAPTER 10

THE HERMIT

Ο N THE morning of July 14, a few months after Rose received her golden ring, the bells of Lima sent their mournful music over the city once again. The holy Franciscan missionary, Father Francis Solano, was dead.

Listening to the somber sound, Maria de Oliva muttered a brief prayer. "We'd better go at once to the Franciscan convent, Marianna. I'm sure there'll be miracles over there today. Get all our rosaries and medals. We can touch them to the body of Father Francis and use them as relics."

The Indian woman nodded. Both mistress and servant realized the loss. Father Francis Solano was a real saint. Back in 1589, when he had first come to the New World, he and his companions had been shipwrecked off the coast of Colombia. For weeks the little group of survivors wandered through the coastal forests without meeting a soul. Then a few of the men died from eating poisonous plants, and despair seized the rest. Only Father Francis remained calm. He insisted that his companions stay near the coast. Another boat would arrive from Panama soon, he assured them, and carry them safely to Peru.

"I remember when he finally did reach Lima," said Marianna slowly. "We were so disappointed when he insisted on leaving almost at once. Ah, señora, he was already weak from hardship, yet he thought nothing of walking fourteen hundred miles, across mountains and jungles, to his Franciscan mission in Argentina!"

"And he made that trip twice, Marianna. Don't forget that."

"Sí, señora-eleven years later, when his hard work among the Indians was finished. Ah, but he was a good soul! I'll go now and find the rosaries and medals."

Out in the garden, among her beloved trees and flowers, Rose was thinking of Father Francis, too. She would never forget that December day in the year 1604 when the brown-clad friar had preached his famous sermon in the market place. She had been just eighteen then. Now, six years later, the memory was still fresh.

"He told people to do penance for their sins," she recalled. "He insisted that God would destroy Lima unless they ceased to offend Him. That night there weren't enough priests in the city to hear everyone who wanted to go to confession. Enemies were reconciled, stolen goods restored to their owners, three thousand marriages properly ratified. Ah, dear Father Francis, give me some of that zeal for souls which you so truly possessed!"

Having offered her brief prayer, Rose turned down the path that led to the back of the garden. There a familiar figure awaited her.

"Doña Maria! Why, I didn't expect to see you this morning!"

Doña Maria de Usátegui, the wife of Don Gonzalo, gave Rose an affectionate embrace. "My dear, I came in quietly by the side gate. Your mother doesn't know I'm here yet. You see, I wanted to have a word with you alone."

"The children aren't sick again?"

"No, no. They're fine. Rose, my dear, how would you like to live with Don Gonzalo and me? Be a daughter of ours, so to speak?"

The young woman stared at her visitor in amazement. "I don't understand..."

"Of course you don't. But my husband and I both feel you'd be happier with us. Since your mother can't understand the type of life you want, since she's never been happy that you joined the Third Order of Saint Dominic..."

Rose laughed. No one would have guessed that Doña Maria's words cut through her like a knife. They were so true! Maria de Oliva never lost an opportunity to show she did not approve of Dominican Tertiaries.

"Mother just doesn't understand yet. She finds it hard to believe that I'm still myself, underneath this white habit."

"Exactly. I've heard some of her criticisms and so has my husband. Dear little friend, we've a large house and plenty of this world's goods. Why don't  you come and live with us? The children would be so happy!"

For the rest of the day, and for many days thereafter, Rose pondered this kindly offer of Doña Maria de Usátegui. In the end she decided to decline. Even though Maria de Oliva frequently found fault with Dominican Tertiary life, with the prayers and sacrifices to which her daughter was dedicated, Rose knew such trials could be turned into great merit.

"Long ago I offered to pray and suffer for others," she thought. "Dear Lord, don't let me run away from any pain now. Let Mother's failure to understand only bring me closer to You. Let it help to make me a saint."

The weeks passed, with their ceaseless round of ordinary activities. Always clad in her white Tertiary habit and veil, Rose tended her flowers and herbs, did her fine sewing and embroidery. She was completely unaware of the rumors spreading throughout the city to the effect that she was quite as holy as those other great servants of God, Archbishop Turribius, Father Francis Solano, and Brother Martin de Porres. Hardly a day passed that men and women did not come to beg her prayers, to ask her advice on one subject or another, to touch her famous statue of the Child Jesus, which she called "The Little Doctor."

"Rose is another Saint Catherine of Siena," they told one another. "She fasts all the time. She sleeps only two hours a night. She has given her whole self to the saving of sinners."

Eventually, however, some of all this did reach the young woman's ears. Quickly she went in search of her mother with a strange request. She wanted permission to be a hermit in the garden. If she cut herself off from the world, if she appeared only rarely in the streets, perhaps people would forget about her. But since the little oratory she had made as a child, far back among the banana trees, was nearly in ruins, it would be necessary to build another. And this second hermitage would have to be of more durable material with a door that would lock.

Maria de Oliva refused to listen to any such suggestion. It was bad enough to see her pretty daughter in a religious habit, to know that she had thrown away forever the chance to have a husband and children. But that she should live as a hermit in a little adobe house in the garden-never!

Four years passed. Rose did not give up hope of having her little adobe house. Finally, overcome by the pleadings of Father Alonso Velasquez, Doña Maria de Usátegui and Don Gonzalo, her mother gave in. Yes-Rose could bury herself as a hermit, if Father Alonso thought this the proper thing to do. She could stop having visitors. She could ruin her health by spending hours in a damp mud hut.

"Mother, how can I ever thank you?" cried the girl. "I've wanted it for so long!"

Maria sighed as she looked at her daughter, now twenty-eight years of age. She was still pretty, but far too thin. The white Dominican habit could not hide the fact that for years Rose had been following a very difficult life.

"Sometimes I can't understand why you didn't enter a convent, child. What other girl in Lima prays as much as you?"

Rose laughed, remembering that Sunday afternoon at Santo Domingo when a mysterious power had kept her kneeling at the Rosary Shrine. "It was never my vocation to be a nun, Mother. Please believe me. And please pray that I serve God well as a hermit."

"I'll pray," said the mother sadly. "But just remember this if it hadn't been that Father Alonso thought it the thing to do, I'd never have given my permission. It's it's such an odd kind of life for a young woman!"

For the next few days Rose and Ferdinand were very busy. A site had been chosen for the hermitage, closer to the house this time, and not cut off from the sunlight. An area five feet by four had been traced on the ground, and near at hand was a supply of rough adobe bricks. They were light brown in color and not too heavy to lift.

"Ferdinand, what would I do without you?" said Rose as the two set to work on the proposed cell. "You've always been so good to me, ever since we were small."

"It's no great trouble to build this little place, Rose. The only thing that worries me is how you're going to be able to live in such a tiny house. Couldn't we make it just a little bigger?"

The girl shook her head. "I want it small so there won't be room for many visitors. And just one tiny window."

"What about the door? How do you want that?"

"I have special plans for the door. It's to be very low, and just big enough for a person to crawl through on his hands and knees. You see, the smaller and more uncomfortable we make this little cell, the fewer people will want to come and see me."

The young man smiled. This was certainly true. Not many of his mother's friends, for example, would want to crawl through a tiny door on their knees.

"You tell me what you wish and that's the way it will be, Rose. I want you to have happy memories of me when you come to live in this little hermitage."

"Memories? You're not going away, Ferdinand?"

"Yes. I'm going to Chile next month."

"On business?"

"No, I plan to join the arıny. After all, I'm thirty years old and it's time I settled down somewhere."

Rose checked her surprise and disappointment. This favorite brother spoke the truth. Most men his age were already married, with homes and families of their own. Yet she would miss him so much.

"I'll pray for you every day," she said gently. "No matter where you go, my prayers will follow you. And I'm sure you'll like living in Chile, Ferdinand. You'll marry a nice girl...and you'll have a beautiful little daughter...."

"What are you talking about?" the man asked incredulously.

"You're going to name the little girl after me. She'll be called Mary Rose."

"Well," said Ferdinand, laughing heartily, "you're right about one thing: if I ever do have a daughter, she'll have your name. Who knows-maybe some day she'll even visit this little hermitage!"

Rose smiled at him. Although he did not guess it, her brother spoke the truth. Mary Rose would indeed come to Lima one day, a very famous little girl.

After a few more days of hard work, the adobe hermitage was at last finished. The younger Flores children had great fun crawling in and out of the tiny door, and standing on a chair to look through the one small window that opened onto the garden. Friends and neighbors, and even several priests, came to view the adobe house which Rose and Ferdinand had made. A few even measured the dimensions to make sure their eyes were not playing tricks.

"Five feet long, four feet wide, six feet high!"

declared Father Alonso Velasquez in amazement.

"Rose, it's far too small!"

"Father, it's large enough for Our Lord and me. I think I'll be very happy here."

Doña Maria de Usátegui, who was also among the visitors inspecting the hermitage, laid an affectionate hand on the younger woman's shoulder.

"The invitation still stands," she whispered. "My husband and 1 still want you to come and live with us. You'll let us know if you change your mind?"

Rose nodded. Don Gonzalo and Doña Maria were such very good friends. She knew they both worried about her health, about the life of hardship to which she had dedicated herself.

"I won't forget the invitation," she smiled. "Or your other kindnesses, either. Thank you so much for everything, Doña Maria."

After she had begun to live in the little hermitage, Rose continued to work at her sewing, her embroidery, the raising of flowers and herbs. When night came, however, she shut herself in and gave herself over to prayer. There, amid the silence of the darkened garden, she poured out her heart in praise and petition.

Such actions were pleasing to God, and He flooded the new hermit's soul with many graces. Frequently He appeared to her as a little Child, encouraging her to continue with her difficult vocation. He taught her she had nothing to fear as long as she put all her confidence in Him.

At such times Rose thought she would die of sheer happiness. What a wonderful thing life is, she told herself. Any soul that has Sanctifying Grace, no matter how weak the soul is, can be of use to its fellows. All that is necessary is to think of God and His goodness. Then will come such an urge to be like Him, to share in His truth and beauty, that the soul cannot help exchanging its cowardice for courage. It begins to resemble God. And because of that, it glows with a great love for other souls. It wants them to have Sanctifying Grace and to love God, too. It wants them to share its happiness.

"It's like a beggar who finally becomes rich." Rose would reflect. "When he is poor, he is afraid of other people. He has a low opinion of himself, knowing he can never do anything great. But once he becomes a rich man, everything is changed. His starved body becomes strong. He realizes other people look up to him. And he finds real happiness in sharing his wealth with them."

One summer afternoon Maria de Oliva went in search of her daughter. The sun was warm and the garden bright with the flowers Rose tended so well. But the woman's face as she made her way toward the little adobe hermitage was hard with anger.

"Rose! Are you in there?"

There was no answer. Catching a glimpse of someone moving among the fruit trees, Maria started off in that direction. Probably Rose was gathering oranges for Marianna to take to market the next day.

"Rose! Are you deaf? Haven't you heard me calling you?"

The girl set down a basket half full of luscious fruit. "Did you want me, Mother?"

"I certainly did. Doña Isabel de Mejía came to see me. She has told me something that's upset me dreadfully."

"Her mother's not sick again?"

"Of course not. I'm the one that's sick. Rose, is it true you've told people there's going to be a convent of Dominican nuns in Lima? That Doña Lucia de la Daga will be the first Prioress?"

A smile lit up the young woman's face. "Yes, Mother. It will be called the Monastery of Santa Catalina, after Saint Catherine of Siena."

Maria's voice was shrill. "Doña Lucia is a happily married woman, with five lovely children! What business have you to spread the rumor that she's going to be a nun?"

"But it's true, Mother. There will be a Monastery of Santa Catalina. Doña Lucia will go there with her sister Clara. Father Luis de Bilbao will say the first Mass...."

"So you're turning into a prophet, are you? What do you know about the future? Are you losing your senses since you've shut yourself up in that wretched hermitage?"

Rose lowered her eyes. How could she make her mother understand that the news about Santa Catalina had been given to her in prayer? That her beloved friend and patroness, Saint Catherine of Siena, had come in person to tell her about the new monastery?

"I'm sorry, Mother. I didn't realize you'd be so upset about what I told Doña Isabel."

"Why shouldn't I be upset? What's Doña Lucia going to think of me? And her husband? Why, you've really said the good man is going to die...and his five children, too. Otherwise how could Doña Lucia enter a convent?"

Rose smiled faintly. "Please don't be cross, Mother. Things really will happen as I've said."

"Stop!" cried Maria. "Soon you'll be telling people that your own mother is going to found a convent. I won't have such talk, Rose. It's too embarrassing!"

The girl looked down at the golden ring which Ferdinand had obtained for her four years ago. There were tears in her eyes.

"You won't found a monastery, Mother, but some day you'll enter one. Doña Lucia will give you the Dominican habit at Santa Catalina. You'll be very happy there. And I promise you that when you're ready to die, I'll come to get you myself."

 

St. Rose of Lima - A DAUGHTER OF SAINT DOMINIC

 

CHAPTER 9

A DAUGHTER OF SAINT DOMINIC

T WAS a few weeks later, on August 10, the I feast of Saint Laurence, that Rose joined the Dominican Order as a Tertiary. Her face was radiant as she knelt before the Rosary Shrine in Santo Domingo and heard her confessor, Father Alonso Velasquez, begin the ceremony of reception:

O Lord Jesus Christ, Who didst vouchsafe to clothe Thyself with the garment of our mortality, we beseech Thee, of the abundance of Thy great mercy, that Thou wouldst be pleased so to bless this kind of garment, which the holy Fathers have appointed to be worn in token of innocence and humility, that she who is to be clothed with it may be worthy to put on Thee, Christ Our Lord.

Rose looked up at the garment Father Alonso was blessing. It was the Dominican habit of white wool. spread out now upon the altar-the very same type of dress once worn by Saint Catherine of Siena and other holy souls. In a few minutes this white habit would be hers to wear, instead of the fine clothes of her mother's choice.

How good God was to bless a poor Peruvian girl with the vocation of a Dominican Tertiary. In just a few minutes she would no longer be alone in the task of saving her own soul and the souls of others. The prayers of Dominicans everywhere-priests, nuns, lay Brothers, other Tertiaries-would be joined to hers in a very special way.

Rose shut her eyes in sheer happiness as Father Alonso sprinkled her with Holy Water and continued the prayer:

May the Lord also sprinkle thee with hyssop, who art now going to be clothed with our garments, that thou mayest be made clean, so that being thus cleansed and made whiter than snow in thy soul, thou mayest so appear outwardly in our habit..

Maria de Oliva, kneeling a few feet away, dabbed her tearful eyes. This certainly was not what she had planned for her favorite child a life in the world as a lay member of a religious Order. Yet what could she do? The girl absolutely refused to be interested in marriage. All she cared about was saving souls.

"Perhaps she'll change her mind in a little while," the mother told herself between sobs. "Perhaps after a few months she'll find the Tertiary life too hard."

But Rose of Saint Mary, the new Tertiary daughter of Saint Dominic, was happier than she had ever been before. At last she was walking the same road walked by Saint Catherine of Siena nearly two hundred and fifty years before. Even Don Gonzalo was satisfied, as the months passed, that Rose had chosen the right path. Although other men and women might be called to the religious life, her vocation was to become a saint in the world. Never again would he urge that she be a nun in any of Lima's five convents.

"God has given that girl a very special work," Don Gonzalo told himself. "She is to be a model for all who must reach perfection without the help of the cloister."

On August 10, 1607, Rose returned to the Rosary Shrine at Santo Domingo. Her one year's probation as a Tertiary was over. Was she willing to continue the life? asked Father Alonso Velasquez. Was she willing to make a promise to live according to the Rule of the Dominican Order until she died?

The girl, now twenty-one years old, had not a single doubt concerning her Tertiary profession. As Rose of Saint Mary, she gave the necessary promise. Now she was a real member of the Dominican Order.

Time passed. To all outward appearances Rose seemed changed very little: she still lived quietly at home, raising her flowers and doing fine sewing for the wealthy women of Lima. Yet a change was taking place, nevertheless. Little by little, through devoutly receiving the Holy Eucharist, through patiently bearing trials and troubles, Gaspar's daughter was slowly becoming more like Christ. Sometimes when her mother argued that she took too little care of her health, she answered gently: "You and I shall live as long as God wishes, Mother. When our work for Him is done, then we can worry about our health."

"Who's going to think about such things then?" demanded Maria sharply. "It'll be too late."

Rose smoothed the folds of her white woolen habit. "Mother dear, life is really very simple if only we remember that we are servants-servants of God and our neighbor."

"Servants? Who wants to be a servant? Rose, such talk is disgusting! At that rate, a Negro or an Indian is as good as a white man! And a person with money and education is no better than an ignorant beggar! To think that you talk this wayafter all I've done for you.

Rose took a deep breath. "Mother, please don't be angry! I'm only trying to help a little. After all, if we really believe that God is our Father and His Son our Brother..."

"Enough of your preaching, young lady. Ever since you became a Tertiary you've been far too pious to suit me. Just remember this: I don't want to hear any more talk about being a servant. Your father may be poor but he comes from a good family. And so do I!"

The failure of this and other conversations proved  to Rose what she had always known-that relief for the lonely heart can be found in prayer. In prayer, weak human nature reaches out for God and becomes strong with His help. Troubles of all kinds, when they are offered to Him in union with the sufferings His Son knew on earth, turn into merit of untold value. That was one reason why there was so much sorrow in the world: without pain very few souls would ever think of turning to God.

"Everyone wants to be happy," Rose often thought. "That's why we were made. But how hard it is to remember that we can only be satisfied with the greatest good of all-God Himself!"

On Palm Sunday of the year 1610, when she was twenty-four years old, Rose went to Mass at Santo Domingo. The ceremony was a long one, with the blessing of the Palms and the procession through the church preceding the Holy Sacrifice. As two lay Brothers finished distributing the blessed Palm to the people, the choir broke into a triumphant hymn and everyone made ready to join in the procession. Rose hesitated. Somehow or other she had been overlooked in the distribution of the green branches. She alone, of all the people in Santo

Domingo, had no piece of blessed Palm.

"Why?" she thought. "Can it be that I'm not worthy to walk with the others?"

She thrust her disappointment aside, however. It was only a mistake the lay Brothers had been too busy to notice her. There was no reason why she could not walk in the procession, too. Even though she had no Palm branch to carry, she could still call  to mind the first Palm Sunday, when Our Lord had entered Jerusalem amid the welcome of His happy followers.

When the choir finally finished singing and the long line of people returned to their seats, Rose cast a swift glance at the Rosary Shrine. How she loved this statue of Our Lady holding her Infant Son! Here, four years ago, she had received the Blessed Mother's approval of her vocation to the Third Order of Saint Dominic. That Sunday afternoon when she had been forced to remain on her knees before the golden altar, a voice had spoken in her heart. It had told her she was not called to work out her salvation in a monastery. Rather, she was to stay in the world-she was to be a saint amid everyday surroundings. She would spend her time praying, helping with the housework, sewing, working in the garden, and caring for the sick poor.

"Dearest Mother, thank you again for letting me be a Dominican Tertiary," she whispered. "And I'm not sad about the lay Brothers' forgetting to give me a Palm branch. The Palm I really want is the one that will never fade, the one you give to the blessed in Heaven."

As Rose breathed this little prayer, her startled eyes suddenly beheld the Blessed Mother smile and turn lovingly toward the Child in her arms. No one else in the crowded church saw the wonder, nor did they hear the words which the Child presently uttered-words which echoed in the girl's heart like the sweetest music:

"Rose of My Heart, be thou My spouse!"

Rose saw and heard, however, and her heart filled with pure joy. God had blessed her with still another wonderful gift! In her beloved Dominican church He had told her that she was really numbered among His chosen ones!

"It's too much!" she whispered. "I'm not worthy of such love."

Yet she knew she had not been mistaken about the vision. She, a poor girl of Peru, had been chosen from all eternity to belong to God, to be one of His especially beloved friends forever and ever. She had read of such favors being given to others, including her dear patroness, Saint Catherine of Siena. Now, through a miracle of grace, the marvelous honor was to be hers, too.

For the rest of the day Rose could think of little else. When Ferdinand remarked that she seemed very happy, she nodded.

"It's quite true-I am. And I've another favor to ask."

The young man laughed. "I suppose you want me to take you some place?"

"No, I just want you to make me a ring."

"A ring? You want a piece of jewelry?"

"That's right. But nothing from the markets. Just a plain ring of your own design. Ferdinand, you will do this for me? It's really so very important."

As the young man looked at his sister's eager face, he realized that something unusual had taken place. For years Rose had been thinking constantly of other people-praying for them, helping out when they were sick, seeing that the poor had all the flowers and fruit she could spare from the garden. Now the time had finally come when she wanted something for herself.

"Of course I'll get you a ring. Do you want it of silver or of gold? And what's your favorite stone?"

Rose hesitated. Both metals were common in Peru. And diamonds and emeralds were common, too, being found in abundance in the mines of the Andes. She could have a really beautiful ring without very much expense.

"I'd like a gold ring, Ferdinand. But without any stone. Just a plain gold band."

"How about having a little motto on it? A few words engraved on the outside? That could be easily done."

"What words would you suggest?"

The young man thought a moment. "How about this: 'Rose of My Heart, be thou My spouse'?"

The girl's heart filled. She could not express her great emotion. Without realizing it, her brother had been divinely inspired to choose the very words she had heard in church-the words spoken to her that morning by the Child Jesus Himself.

"Well, what's the matter? Don't you like my idea?"

"Ferdinand, it's beautiful! I can't think of anything I'd like better."

"All right. We'll have a plain gold ring made for you, with those words on the outside. I know the very jeweler to do the job, too-an old friend of mine who hasn't been very busy lately."

Rose smiled gratefully. "And he can make the ring soon?"

"Of course. Probably in a couple of days. I'll go to see him tomorrow with a sketch of what we want."

When she was once more alone, Rose sought out her little oratory at the back of the garden. It was always quiet and peaceful here. Only infrequently did anyone else in the family come down among the banana trees. There were too many spiders and mosquitoes, they said. Besides, the sun very rarely penetrated the dense tangle of vines and branches. It was a dark and gloomy place at best.

Rose was not afraid of the spiders and mosquitoes, however. She had never once harmed them, and they seemed eager to show her their friendship. Whenever she said the Rosary or her other prayers in her little oratory, the mosquitoes buzzed in a most friendly fashion. It was almost as though they were trying to pray, too. As for the spiders, they stopped their wanderings and their weavings: they would do these things when their young friend had finished talking to God.

Rose was not thinking of spiders or mosquitoes, however, as she entered her little shrine. Rather it was of the wonderful grace that had been given to her that morning in the Dominican church. And of course there was the ring-the beautiful golden ring she would always wear to remind herself that she belonged to God. How could she forget that?

"This is Palm Sunday," she thought. "If my ring is ready by Wednesday, perhaps Father Alonso could put it in the Repository on Holy Thursday. How wonderful that would be!"

Yes, it would be wonderful. But unusual, too. Probably it would take quite a lot of explaining to make her confessor understand.

"I'll do my best," she resolved within herself. "Our Lord is hidden in the Repository on Holy Thursday. I want my ring to be with Him then. On Easter Sunday, when He comes back to us in glory, I will take my ring and wear it until I die!"

St. Rose of Lima - FAREWELL TO SANTO DOMINGO

 

CHAPTER 8

FAREWELL TO SANTO DOMINGO

D ON GONZALO was not the only one to think it well for Rose to be a Poor Clare. Her old friend, Doña Maria de Quiñones, had had the same idea ever since she had helped her uncle, Archbishop Turribius, establish the Franciscan Monastery of Santa Clara.

"Why don't you want to be a nun?" she asked one day, as the two sat talking in Gaspar's garden. "Think of the peace you would have in the convent! Think of the happiness of giving yourself wholly to God! My dear, Don Gonzalo has told me everything. If it's a matter of the dowry, or what your family will do without the money from your flowers, don't worry another minute. Don Gonzalo will look after everything."

Rose nodded. "He wants me to be a Poor Clare," she said slowly. "And you have the same idea. Oh, Doña Maria, I don't know what to do!"

The woman smiled. She knew what was the trouble. Long ago Rose had given her heart to the Order of Saint Dominic, and as yet there were no Dominican nuns in Lima.

"You're twenty years old now. If you're really sure you don't want to marry..."

"I'm very sure, Doña Maria."

"Then why wait? If God wanted you to be a Dominican, surely He would have seen to it that a convent of those nuns should be here for you." "Saint Catherine of Siena wasn't a nun. Perhaps I could be a Dominican Tertiary just as she was." "And live in the world? Put up with all kinds of misunderstandings? Rose, my dear, a long time ago I told you how hard it is to lead a single life in the world. It takes a very special grace. With the love God has given you for prayer and sacrifice-well, I can't help thinking you belong in a convent."

"In Santa Clara?"

"Naturally the Monastery of Santa Clara is very close to my heart. But there are four others in Lima. How would you like to be an Augustinian? The Monastery of the Incarnation is the first convent for women in the New World. It would be a great honor to be accepted there, Rose."

The girl sighed. It really shouldn't matter so much. One could serve God under the Rule of Saint Augustine or of Saint Clare as well as under that of Saint Dominic. Yet why did her whole soul cry out to be a Dominican? Why had she always taken Saint Catherine of Siena for her special model? Even the black and white butterflies in her father's garden-she had always preferred them to any others because they reminded her of the two colors in the Dominican habit.

Weeks passed, and finally Rose confided to Ferdinand that she had made up her mind. If Don Gonzalo was still willing to provide her with a dowry, she would become an Augustinian at the Monastery of the Incarnation.

"An Augustinian? But what made you change your mind, Rose? I thought you didn't want to go into a convent."

"Ssh, Ferdinand! You mustn't let anyone know about this."

"You mean you haven't told Father or Mother?"

The girl shook her head. "No," she said slowly. "Just now only my confessor at Santo Domingo knows about it-Father Alonso Velasquez."

"And what does he think?"

"He didn't say much-just gave me his blessing and a few words of advice."

The young man looked at his sister thoughtfully. Better than anyone else in the family, he knew how faithfully she had given herself to prayer and good works. It had always been that way, even when they were small children. And now she was about to make the greatest sacrifice of all.

"You're sad about something, Ferdinand."

"Not exactly. But I'm going to miss you, Rose. I can't imagine what it's going to be like to come home and not find you somewhere about. You've always been here when I wanted you. Now if I want to talk to you there'll be bars between us; maybe other nuns listening to what I say. That's the way it is in convents, isn't it?"

"Hush! Someone may hear you."

"What if they do? They'll have to know sometime."

"I wish," cried Rose, "I could tell the whole world right now. But Father Alonso says to keep it a secret. Even from Father and Mother. By the way, will you do me a little favor?"

"What?"

"The Mother Abbess expects me at the convent next Sunday afternoon. Will you take me there, Ferdinand? I can't very well walk over by myself."

The young man nodded. It was the Spanish custom that no girl of good family should ever walk through the streets unescorted. Many a time he had had to accompany Rose on a visit to some church or convent.

"Of course I'll take you," he said quickly. "Maybe such a good deed will go down in history."

For the rest of the week Rose was very busy, and not only with her flowers. For some time now she had been doing fine sewing and embroidery. Several wealthy ladies were her steady customers, and the money that came in from this new venture was a great help to the family.

"It won't be too different when I've gone away." she told herself, "thanks to Don Gonzalo. What would I do without such a good friend? Not only has he given me a dowry, he's promised to look after the family and see that things go along as usual. Dear Lord, I do thank you for Don Gonzalo! Bless him every day of his life!"

At the hour appointed on Sunday afternoon. Ferdinand and Rose set out for the Monastery of the Incarnation. It was hard for the girl not to say goodbye to her parents, to her sisters and brothers, to Marianna. But it was not to be. Father Alonso Velasquez feared the arguments that might follow if her intentions were made known to her family.

As the familiar wooden gate clicked shut, Rose turned to her favorite brother. "I hope all this is God's Will, Ferdinand."

"What else could it be?"

"I'm not trying to run away from hardships."

"Of course not! In fact, you're taking more upon yourself by going into a monastery."

As they walked through the streets the girl was silent, gazing for the last time at the squat adobe houses, the beggars, the little Indian children playing games. Suddenly a black and white dog darted playfully toward her. Ferdinand threw out a protecting arm.

"Be careful, Rose! He may bite you. And he's not too clean."

"He wouldn't bite anyone, Ferdinand. He's only a puppy. But isn't it strange-he's black and white."

"Black and white! There you go again-still thinking about the Dominicans!"

Rose laughed. "Not really, Ferdinand. But I do wish, if there's enough time..."

"What?"

"I'd like to go to Santo Domingo for a last visit."

The young man nodded. "All right. We can spare a few minutes, I guess."

Once inside the Dominican church, the brother and sister separated. Ferdinand stayed near the back, while his sister went up the right-hand aisle to the Rosary Shrine. She knelt before the golden altar dedicated to Our Lady and once more offered herself as a servant to the Blessed Mother and her Son.

"Help me to be good," she prayed. "Dearest Mother, have mercy on the poor, the suffering, the ignorant. Ask Saint Augustine to pray for me, that I may save many souls as a nun in his holy Order."

As the minutes passed, Ferdinand grew uneasy. Rose was forgetting she had promised to stay only a little while in the Dominican church. The Mother Abbess of the Augustinians had told her to be at the monastery for Vespers. Now, if they walked quickly, they would have just enough time.

He slipped out of the back seat and went rapidly up the aisle. "Rose, it's time we were leaving," he whispered.

The girl looked up. There was very little color in her face and her dark eyes were wide with wonder. "Ferdinand, something's happened! I can't move! It's just as though my knees were glued to the floor!"

"What?"

"It's true. Ever since I knelt down I've had to stay in the same spot. There's some strange power holding me here!"

The young man stared. What had happened? Was his sister coming down with some strange illness? Or was she playing a joke on him? One glance at her pale face, however, and he knew that she spoke the truth. Something mysterious had really taken  place at Our Lady's shrine. Rose really could not rise from her knees.

"I'll help you," he said in a shaky voice. "Here, take my arm. But be quick about it. Some of the people in church are forgetting to say their prayers. There'll be a crowd over here any minute to see what's wrong."

Rose took her brother's arm, but even the combined efforts of the two young people were in vain. Before the golden altar of Our Lady of the Rosary, with its flowers and flickering wax tapers, Rose remained on her knees.

Ferdinand looked about helplessly. What were they going to do? By now the nuns at the monastery would be waiting for their new Sister. Perhaps they would even send a messenger to the Flores house to see why she had not come. If that happened, Rose's plans would be secret no longer.

"Say a prayer or something," the young man suggested quickly. "There must be some way to get you loose."

Rose looked up at the statue of Our Lady. It had suddenly occurred to her that perhaps God did not wish her to be an Augustinian. Perhaps He had worked this wonder to prove to Don Gonzalo and others that her place was in the world, not in a convent. Perhaps-oh, happy thought!-she was meant to be a Dominican Tertiary after all!

"Dearest Mother, I won't be a nun if it isn't God's Will," she said simply. "I'll go back home and live with my family. I'll do my very best to serve Him well there. Only please let me get up!"

The words were no sooner out than Rose knew she could rise to her feet. Her brother stared as she stood up beside him.

"But what happened, Rose? How were you able to get up after all?"

The girl's dark eyes were shining. "She did it, Ferdinand-the Blessed Mother! She doesn't want me to go to the monastery this afternoon. She wants me to go home. I heard her voice in my heart."

The young man shook his head. What was the Mother Abbess of the Augustinians going to say to all this? And Don Gonzalo de Massa?

 

January 13 - Feast of the Baptism of Our Lord

 

ஜனவரி 13ம்‌ தேதி 

நமதாண்டவரின்‌ ஞானஸ்நானத்தின்‌ திருநாள்‌

திவ்ய சுதனாகிய சர்வேசுரனும்‌ மனிதனுமான நமதாண்டவருக்கு, ஞானஸ்நானம்‌ தேவையில்லாத ஒன்று. ஏனெனில்‌, பிறக்கும்‌ மனிதர்‌ எல்லோருக்கும்‌ , ஞானஸ்நானம்‌ அவசியமாயிருக்கிறது என்றும்‌, ஞானஸ்நானம்‌, அவர்களுடைய ஆத்துமங்களை ஜென்மப்‌ பாவதோஷத்திலிருந்து, கழுவி தூய்மைப்‌ படுத்திப் பரிசுத்தப்படுத்துகிறது! என்றும்‌, நம் சத்தியக் கத்தோலிக்க திருச்சபை நமக்குக்‌ கற்பிக்கின்றது. இது தான்‌, இந்தத் திருநாளைப்‌ பற்றி நமக்கு வரும்‌ முதல்‌ சிந்தனையாயிருக்கிறது. அப்படியென்றால்‌, திவ்ய சுதனாகிய சர்வேசுரனும், ஜென்மப்பாவமில்லாமல்‌ பிறந்தவரும்‌ ஜீவிய காலமெல்லாம்‌ பாவமில்லாமல்‌ ஜீவித்தவருமான நமதாண்டவர், திவ்ய சேசுகிறீஸ்துநாதர்‌ சுவாமிக்கு , ஏன்‌ ஞானஸ்நானம்‌ அளிக்கப்பட்டது? திருச்சபையின்‌ பிதாப்பிதாக்களும்‌, மத்திய காலத்தின்‌ வேத இயல்‌ தர்க்க சாஸ்திரிகளும்‌,ஆண்டவரின்‌ ஞானஸ்நானத்தை, ஞானஸ்நானம்‌ என்ற தேவதிரவிய அனுமானத்தை, ஆண்டவர்‌ தாமே உலகத்தில்‌ ஸ்தாபித்தத்‌ திருநாளாகக்‌ கண்டார்கள்‌! அன்று, ஆண்டவருடைய திவ்ய சரீரம்‌, தண்ணீரை ஆசீர்வதித்தது! திவ்ய சேசுநாதர்சுவாமியினுடைய ஞானஸ்நானத்தினால்‌, அர்ச்சிக்கப்பட்டு, பரிசுத்தப்படுத்தப்பட்டதன்‌ மூலமாக, உலகிலுள்ள எல்லா தண்ணீர்களும்‌, கிறீஸ்துவ ஞானஸ்நானத்தை பெறும்படியாக அழைக்கப்படும்‌ சகல மனிதர்களையும்‌, திவ்ய இஸ்பிரீத்து சாந்துவானவரில்‌ அர்ச்சிக்கக்கூடிய வல்லமையை நித்தியத்திற்குமாகப்‌ பெற்றுக்கொண்டன! யோர்தான்‌ நதியில்‌ நின்றுகொண்டிருந்த திவ்ய சுதனாகிய சர்வேசுரனைப்‌ பற்றி, பரலோகத்திலிருந்து சப்தித்த திவ்ய பிதாவாகிய சர்வேசுரனுடைய திவ்ய குரலொலியும்‌, திவ்ய சுதன்‌ மேல்‌ பரலோகத்திலிருந்து திவ்ய இஸ்பிரீத்து சாந்துவான சர்வேசுரன்‌ புறா வடிவில்‌ இறங்கிவந்ததும்‌, சர்வேசுரனுடைய மகா பரிசுத்த தமதிரித்துவ சுபாவத்தை பகிரங்கமாக, இப்பரம இரகசிய திருநிகழ்வின்போது, உலகத்திற்கு வெளிப்படுத்தியது! 

மேலும்‌, இக்காட்சியில்‌, மனுக்குலத்தின்‌ இரட்சணியத்தின்‌ மட்டில்‌ திவ்ய பிதாவாகிய சர்வேசுரனும்‌ , திவ்ய சுதனாகிய சர்வேசுரனும்‌, திவ்ய இஸ்பிரீத்துசாந்துவான சர்வேசுரனும்‌, கொண்டிருந்த அலுவல்கள்‌ நமக்குக்‌ காண்பிக்கப்படுகின்றன! உலக சிருஷ்டிப்புக்கு முன்னரே, பிதாவாகிய சர்வேசுரன்‌, தேர்ந்தெடுக்கப்பட்டவர்களை அன்புகூர்ந்தார்‌! (எபே1:4) . சிதறிப்போனதைத்‌ தேடி இரட்சிக்குமபடியாகவே மனுமகனும்‌ வந்திருக்கிறார்‌! (லூக் 19:10).

 திவ்ய இஸ்பிரீத்துசாந்துவானவர்‌ பாவத்தைக்‌ குறித்து உலகத் தைக்‌ கண்டித்து உணர்த்துவார்‌! (அரு16:8).திவ்ய இஸ்பிரீத்து சாந்துவானவர்‌, விசுவசிக்கிற மனிதர்களை, திவ்ய சுதன்‌ மூலமாக திவ்ய பிதாவாகிய சர்வேசுரனிடம்‌ கூட்டிவருவார்‌. 

 யோர்தான்‌ நதியில்‌ நமதாண்டவர்‌ ஞானஸ்நானம்‌ பெற்ற போது, திவ்ய சேசுகிறீஸ்துநாதர்‌ சுவாமியின்‌ மூலமாக சர்வேசுரனுடைய தேவ இரக்கத்தின்‌ எல்லா மகிமைமிகு சத்தியங்களும் காட்சியாக வெளிப்படுத்தப்பட்டன!  

அர்ச்‌.ஸ்நாபக அருளப்பர்‌, ஞானஸ்நானம்‌ என்ற தேவதிரவிய அனுமானத்தை ஸ்தாபிக்கவில்லை. ஏனெனில்‌, நமதாண்டவர்‌, மட்டுமே, தேவதிரவிய அனுமானத்தை ஸ்தாபிக்க முடியும்‌. அர்ச்‌.ஸ்நாபக அருளப்பர்‌ அளித்த ஞானஸ்நானம்‌, தேவ வரப்பிரசாதக் கருவியின்‌ பலனை அளிக்கிறதாக, இருந்தது; அதாவது, இது. ஒரு தேவதிரவிய அனுமானத்தைப்போல்‌, தன்னிலேயே தேவ வரப்பிரசாதத்தை அளிக்காமல்‌, அதைப்‌ பெறுவதற்கான வழியை ஆயத்தம்‌ செய்தது. அதாவது உதவி வரப்பிரசாதத்தை, அருளப்பருடைய ஞானஸ்நானம்‌ கொண்டிருந்தது! மெசியாவின்‌ வருகைக்காக தபசு செய்யும்படி மக்களை  அழைப்பதற்காக, வனாந்தரத்தில்‌ கூக்குரலிடும்‌ குரலொலியாக இசையாஸ்‌ தீர்க்கதரிசி (இசை 40:3), அர்ச்‌.ஸ்நாபக அருளப்பரைப்‌ பற்றிக்‌ குறிப்பிடுகின்றார்‌. ஆண்டவருக்கு ஞானஸ்நானம்‌ அளித்ததன்‌ மூலமாக, அர்ச்‌.ஸ்நாபக அருளப்பர்‌, அங்குக்‌ கூடியிருந்த மக்களிடம்‌ பகிரங்கமாக , இவ்வளவு காலமாக யாருக்காகக்‌ காத்திருந்தார்களோ, அவரை, திவ்ய இஸ்பிரீத்து சாந்துவிலும்‌, அக்கினியிலும்‌ ஞானஸ்நானம்‌ கொடுக்க வருகிற திவ்ய செம்மறிப்புருவையானவரும்‌, தேவசுதனுமான திவ்ய இரட்சகரை, சுட்டிக்காண்பித்து , அறிவித்தார்‌! (மத்‌.3:17).

Feast of the Baptism of Our Lord

January 13

At first glance, the Baptism of Our Lord might seem an odd feast. The Catholic Church teaches that the Sacrament of Baptism is necessary for the remission of sins, particularly Original Sin.

Why was Christ baptized? After all, He was born without Original Sin, and He lived His entire life without sinning.

Many of the Fathers of the Church, as well as the medieval Scholastics, saw Christ's Baptism as the institution of the sacrament of Baptism. His Flesh blessed the water. Sanctified by the baptism of Jesus, the waters received forever the power to sanctify, through the Holy Spirit, all those who are called to receive Christian baptism.

The voice of God the Father and the descent of the Holy Spirit from heaven upon God the Son standing in the river Jordan was the public manifestation of the Trinitarian nature of God.

It also depicts the work of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit in the salvation of mankind.

• The Father loves the elect from before the foundation of the world (Ephesians 1:4).
• He sends His Son to seek and save the lost (Luke 19:10).
• The Holy Spirit convicts of sin (John 16:8) and draws the believer to the Father through the Son.

All the glorious truth of the mercy of God through Jesus Christ is on display at His baptism in the river Jordan.

St. John the Baptist did not institute the Sacrament of Baptism, for Christ alone could institute a Sacrament. The baptism given by St. John had the effect of a sacramental; it did not of itself give grace but prepared the way for it.

John was the “voice crying in the wilderness” prophesied by Isaiah, calling people to repentance in preparation for their Messiah (Isaiah 40:3). By baptizing Him, John was declaring to all that here was the One they had been waiting for, the Son of God, the One he had predicted would baptize “with the Holy Spirit and fire” (Matthew 3:11).

January 12 - St. Tatiana of Rome

 ஜனவரி 12ம் தேதி

வேதசாட்சியான உரோமையின் அர்ச். டாசியானா திருநாள்

இவள், உரோமாபுரியைச் சேர்ந்த மிகவும் பிரசத்திபெற்ற உயரிய குடும்பத்தில் பிறந்தாள்; இவள் தனது கன்னிமையை, திவ்‌விய சேசுகிறீஸ்து நாதர் சுவாமிக்கு அர்ப்பணித்து, கன்னியாஸ்திரியாக ஜீவிக்க தீர்மானித்தாள். அலெக்சாண்டர் செவருஸ் சக்கரவர்த்தியாக ஆண்ட காலத்தில், இவள் கைது செய்யப்பட்டாள்; அப்போலோ தேவதையினுடைய பசாசின் கோவிலுக்கு இழுத்துச் செல்லப்பட்டு, அஞ்ஞான விக்கிரகங்களுக்கு பலி செலுத்தும்படி வலுவந்தம் செய்யப்பட்டாள்; அர்ச். டாசியானா, ஆண்டவரை நோக்கி ஜெபிக்கத் துவக்கினாள்; உடனே, பூகம்பம் ஏற்பட்டது; அந்த அஞ்ஞான விக்கிரகங்கள் எல்லாம் கீழே விழுந்து சுக்கு நூறாக உடைந்தன. அந்த அப்போலோ கோவிலின் ஒரு பாகம் இடிந்து, அஞ்ஞான குருக்கள் மேல் விழுந்தது. விக்கிரகங்களுக்குள் மறைந்து தங்கி வாழ்ந்திருந்த பசாசு, கூக்குரலிட்டு, கத்தியபடி, அந்த கோவிலை விட்டு வெளியே பறந்துபோனது. கூடியிருந்தவர்கள், காற்றில், பறந்து சென்ற பசாசின் நிழலைக் கண்டனர். இதைக்கண்டு கோபவெறிகொண்ட அஞ்ஞானிகள், அர்ச். டாசியானாவின் கண்களை இரும்புக் கொக்கிகளால் பிடுங்கி சித்ரவதை செய்தனர்; இக்கொடிய உபாதனைகளைப் பொறுமையுடன் ஏற்று அனுபவித்தபடி, அர்ச். டாசியானா, தன்னை உபத்தி ரவப்படுத்துகிறவர்களுக்காக வேண்டிக்கொண்டாள்; அவர்களுடைய மெய் ஞானக்கண்களை ஆண்டவர் திறக்கும்படியாக வேண்டிக்கொண்டாள்; உடனே, அவர்களுள் எட்டுபேர், புதுமையாக மனந்திரும்பி, வேதசாட்சிகளானார்கள்.

பின், அஞ்ஞானிகள், டயானா தேவதையின் கோவிலுக்கு அர்ச். டாசியானாவை இழுத்துச்சென்று, டயானா தேவதைக்கு பலிசெலுத்த வற்புறுத்தினர்; அர்ச். டாசியானா, சிலுவை அடையாளத்தை வரைந்து, அர்ச். சிலுவை மந்திரத்தை ஜெபித்த பிறகு ஆண்டவரை நோக்கி ஜெபிக்கத் துவக்கினாள்; திடீரென்று, மாபெரும் இடியும் மின்னலும் ஏற்பட்டு, அஞ்ஞான தேவதையையும், பலிப்பொருட்களைவும், அஞ்ஞான குருக்களையும் இடி தாக்கியது.

பின்னர், ஒரு சர்க்கஸில் பசியுடனிருந்த சிங்கத்தின் முன்பாக, அர்ச். டாசியானாவை தள்ளி விட்டனர்; சிங்கம், அவளுடைய பாதத்தண்டையில் படுத்துக் கொண்டது. கி.பி.235ம் வருடம், ஜனவரி 12ம் தேதியன்று, அர்ச். டாசியானா, ஒரு வாளால் தலைவெட்டிக் கொல்லப்பட்டு, வேத சாட்சியாக மரித்தாள்.

அர்ச். டாசியானாவே! எங்களுக்காக வேண்டிக்கொள்ளும்!

Martyrdom of St. Tatiana of Rome
January 12, 235 AD

St. Tatiana was born into an illustrious Roman family and chose to remain a virgin, consecrating herself entirely to Christ.

During the reign of Emperor Alexander Severus, Tatiana was arrested and brought to the temple of Apollo, where she was forced to offer sacrifices to idols. As she began to pray, a sudden earthquake occurred, causing the idols to shatter into pieces. Part of the temple collapsed, falling upon the pagan priests. The demon inhabiting the idols fled with a screech, and its shadow was seen flying through the air by the witnesses.

In response, the pagans brutally tore out Tatiana’s eyes with hooks, but she endured her torment bravely, praying for her persecutors. She asked the Lord to open their spiritual eyes, and as a result, eight of them were converted and martyred.

The pagans then took Tatiana to the temple of the goddess Diana and urged her to offer sacrifice. Tatiana made the Sign of the Cross and began to pray. Suddenly, a deafening thunderclap was heard, and lightning struck the idol, the sacrificial offerings, and the pagan priests.

Tatiana was later brought to a circus and thrown before a hungry lion. However, the lion did not harm her and instead lay peacefully at her feet.

On January 12, 235 AD, St. Tatiana was beheaded with a sword, dying as a martyr for her faith.

De Analogica Nostra Sanctissimae Trinitatis Conceptione (Continuatio)

 

De Analogica Nostra Sanctissimae Trinitatis Conceptione

(Continuatio)

IV. De nomine Amoris quatenus distinctionem personalem et unitatem essentiae dicit.

Thesis. Etiam in voluntate quandoque operatum quoddam procedit, ab ipsa volitione realiter distinctum et tamen el coessentiale: aspiratio scilicet vel spiramen anhelans in obiectum amatum. Qua re perspecta, immanentia consubstantialis qua in divinis. procedit Spiritus Sanctus, aliqualiter a nobis per analogiam concipi potest.

Apertissime, saltem in Summa Theologiae, S. Thomas ponit quoddam operatum in voluntate, procedens ex actuali amore, quod ad instar conceptionis intellectae considerare videtur, ratione tamen habita specialis naturae voluntatis. Legantur Q. 27, art. 4 et Q. 37, art. 1..

Istud autem operatum amoris, iste effectus et quasi fruc tus caritatis non parvam theologis quaestionem praestitit, magnumque laborem, cum eius necessitas minus appareat, et sola operatio omnino sufficere videatur. Ad hoc enim obiectum intellectum concipimus, ut intra nos habeatur, quod pertinet ad rationem cogniiionis. Appetitivae autem potentiae non obiectum ad se trahunt, sed ipsae potius ab ipso attrahuntur. Praesentia igitur obiecti ad has potentias pertinere non videtur, neque operatum secundum quod obiectum reddatur praesens.

Unde e thomistis alii operatum esse in voluntate simpliciter concedunt, quin rem satis explanent, ii scilicet, qui litterae Angelici Doctoris omnino inhaerere solent. Alii vero, liberioris docendi viae, vel illud operatum simpliciter negant, vel ratione tantum ab ipsa volitione distinguunt, et ita in eamdem negationem necessario incidunt.

Ex prioris generis auctoribus audiatur unus pro omnibus Ioannes a S. Thoma:

• In omni appetitu, quo fit pondus et inclinatio in aliquid, oportet quod ex parte ipsius ponderis in terminum, detur aliqua proportio et convenientia cum re illa in quam tamquam in terminum tendit: ex eo enim id quod est grave, ponderat in centrum et in locum inferiorem, quia in se habet proportionem et convenientiam cum loco inferiori... Sed haec proportio in appetitu innato... est etiam determinata ad unum, sicut et ipsa natura semper operatur unum. Unde non indiget aliquo alio pondere seu proportione superaddita, ut determinate tendat in hoc obiectum et inveniatur ei proportionata et conveniens. At vero appetitus elicitus nascitur ex sua forma ut potentia determinabilis ab obiecto per formam intentionalem et apprehensam; de se autem solum dicit potentiam indifferentem et indeterminatam ad volendum. Non quidem quod omnis appetitus habeat in differentiam dominii... sed quod habeat indifferentiam indeterminationis et confusionis, quae dependet et tollitur per formam apprehensam; quae cum existat solum in apprehensione, oportet ulterius in ipsa potentia appetitiva ponere determinatam proportionem et convenientiam cum hoc obiecto potius quam cum illo, et TALIS DETERMINATA PROPORTIO ORTA EX FORMA APPREHENSA PER INTRINSECUM ACTUM, VOCATUR QUALITAS SEU TERMINUS PRODUCTUS PER ACTUM ELICITUM A SE, QUO DETERMINATE PONDERAT, ET RELINQUITUR POTENTIA INCLINATA INTRINSECO ET ELICITO ACTU SIC TERMINATO IN TALE PONDUS ET IMPULSUM, (In

Jam Q. 27, disp. 12, art. 7, n. 5). Quid de his cogitandum sit, mox satis apparebit; nunc autem ad alios auctores gressum faciamus, qui operatum implicite vel explicite negant.

Ita v. g. R. P. Mattiussi S. I., insignis thomista et ipsemet redactor XXIV Thesium, in suis Observationibus in tractatum De Deo Trino, § 57 haec scribit: Non enim nisi ex desiderio ponendi in operatione volitiva eumdem modum analogiae, quem in intellectiva invenimus, atque ex studio comparandi amori nostro processionem Spiritus Sancti, terminum amoris ab amore distinctum asserere possumus ».

Sequitur in hoc magistrum suum Billot, qui dicit: Nul latenus necesse est, ut in praesenti realis distinctio operationis ab operato demonstretur, sed sufficit ut in voluntate ostendatur aliquid quod se habet per modum operationis, et aliquid, VEL RE VEL SALTEM RATIONE DISTINCTUM SE HABENS AD MODUM OPERATI. (De Deo Trino, praev. disp. in Q. 27 § III).

Idem legimus apud Michel, DTC, art. Processions col. 648:

« L'on ne voit pas bien, ce qui, dans l'opération de la volonté, peut être considéré comme un terme opéré. Cependant les théo logiens font observer, qu' il n'est pas nécessaire, que ce terme soit réellement distinct de l'opération..

Acrius iam Penido in suis Gloses sur la Procession d'amour dans la Trinité § 2 (Ephemer. Lov. 1937, 37) et iterum in altero articulo, A propos de la procession d'amour en Dieu, § 1 (Ib. 1938, 338):

• Nous acceptons intégralement cette analyse de Jean de S. Thomas. Nous ajoutons, que nous ne voyons vraiment pas, en quoi elle prouve la production d'un terme réellement distinct de l'acte d'amour. Car c'est bien cette distinction réelle qui est mise en cause. Qu'il y ait une modalité, un aspect, une formalité de l'acte, correspondant à ce que décrit Jean de S. Thomas, voilà qui nous semble hors de conteste. L'intelligence présente le bien, la volonté s'oriente vers lui, c'est à dire qu'elle fait jaillir de soi, sous l'emprise du bien perçu, cette impulsion que l'on nous signale. Toutefois.cette orientation, cette complaisance N'EST PAS UN OPERATUM, UN TERME, MAIS UNE OPÉRATION, UN ACTE, ou plus exactement un aspect qui peut et doit être distingué dans l'acte d'amour... A vouloir maintenir un operatum dans l'amour, ON SERA CONDUIT A MORCELLER L'AMOUR: un premier acte (qui serait, en somme, le désir) aboutirait à la production a'une tendance ou terme, qui déclencherait un deuxième acte, l'amour parfait, (l. c. 37, 43).

Ecce quomodo alii revera amorem in duas qualitates dividant, alii vereantur ne dividant et verecundia sua ingenue omne operatum voluntatis negent! Idem interpretandi error illis offendiculum exstitit, ut absurdam volitioni entitatem superadderent, his ut Aquinatem temere relinquerent. Legentes apud S., Thomam, haberi processionem operati in voluntate, et illud operatum ab operatione realiter differre, diversitatem quoad absolutum et duas qualitates utrique cogitaverunt: unde distinctionem istam hi negaverunt, illi simpliciter affirmaverunt, explanationem suadentem adhuc debentes.

Quid ergo? Distinctionem cogitemus mere relativam, illam scilicet distinctionem realem sed minimam quae esse possit, quam supra inter intelligere et verbum intercedere demonstravimus, et omnia dubia statim aperientur.

Sicut enim intellectus noster duplicem actum habet: simplicem visionem qua ipsum obiectum directe attingimus, et dictionem, qua intra intellectum obiectum concipimus et mediante illa specie expressa ipsum attingimus: ita et voluntas duplicem actum habet, simplicem scilicet adhaesionem, qua ipso obiecto semel habito atque realiter possesso fruimur, et actum foecundum cuiusdam ASPIRATIONIS ». qua in obiectum absens inclinamur, imo impetu amoris impellimur. Et sicut dicere vel manifestare nihil est aliud, nisi PRODUCERE MANIFESTATIONEM, ita aspirare in obiectum nihil est aliud nisi PRODUCERE ASPIRATIONEM: neutrum autem de simplici actu dici potest; videre enim non est producere visionem, neque adhaerere est producere adhaesionem; sed manifestare est producere manifestationem, et aspirare est producere aspirationem. Porro, sicut manifestatio activa a manifestatione passiva vel verbo nonnisi relative distinguitur, cum una tantum habeatur manifestatio, in qua activum et passivum opponuntur, et oppositione sua se invicem excludunt: ita et aspiratio passiva seu spiritus amoris et operatum voluntatis, nonnisi relative ab aspiratione activa distinguitur, i. e. ab ip sa volitione[1].

Hoc autem discrimen interest inter conceptionem intellectam et aspirationem amoris, quod illa magis rationem rei et termini habeat, (est enim similitudo et speculum vivum), haec vero significetur ut in aliud tendens et ita, quamvis sit veri nominis operatum, modum tamen et nomen operationis retinet. Ex quo etiam manifestum fit, quare eadem distinctio minima quae utrobique vere habetur, in intellectu magis appareat, in voluntate quodammodo lateat. Unde et S. Thomas dicit: Haec est differentia inter intellectum et voluntatem, quoa operatio voluntatis terminatur ad res, in quibus est bonum et malum; sed operatio intellectus terminatur in mente, in qua est verum et falsum. ET IDEO VOLUNTAS NON HABET ALIQUID PROGREDIENS A SEIPSA QUOD IN EA SIT, NISI PER MODUM OPERATIONIS: sed intellectus habet in seipso aliquid progrediens ab eo, non solum per modum operationis, sed etiam per modum rei operatae; et ideo verbum significatur ut res procedens, sed amor ut operatio procedens. Unde amor non ita se habet ad hoc ut dicatur personaliter sicut verbam. (De veritate, Q. 4, art. 2, ad 7). Ubi S. Thomas non dicit quod amor non dicitur personaliter in Deo, quod amor non ponit distinctionem realem, sed quod non ita se habet ut dicatur personaliter sicut verbum, i. e.

non ita manifeste, magis latenter, vere nihilominus. Distinctionem realem invenimus, quae, quamvis aliquantulum lateat, omnino sufficit ad realem processionem Spiritus Sancti innuendam, nam Si processio verbi et amoris non sufficit ad distinctionem personalem insinuandam, nulla poterit esse personalis distinctio in divinis. (De potentia, Q. 9. art. 9 ad 7). Hac ergo distinctione minima et mere relativa inspecta, aliqualiter concipi potest, quomodo in divinis tertia Persona procedat, nou genita et tamen consubstantialis: Quia ama tum in voluntate existit ut inclinans et quodammodo impellens intrinsecus amantem in rem amatam, impulsus autem rei viventis ab interiore ad spiritum pertinet, convenit Deo per mo dum amoris procedenti. ut Spiritus dicatur, EIUS SPIRATIONE QUASI QUADAM ASPIRATIONE EXISTENTE. Hinc est, quod Apostolus spiritui et amori impulsum quemdam attribuit; dicitur enim: Quicumque Spiritu Dei aguntur, ii sunt filii Dei. Et: Charitas Dei urget nos, (IV C. G., c. 19).

V. De conceptione analogica et eminentia mysterii.

Thesis. Exsistentia Verbi et Amoris procedentis in divinis ex analogia praedicta ideo demonstrari nequit, quia nulla necessitas apparet has processiones immanentes ponendi in eo, qui est suum intelligeré et sua veritas, suum amare et sua bonitas. Utraque ta men spiritualis processio i. e. Verbi et Amoris implicite revelata censenda est, revelatis solummodo nominibus Patris et Filii et Spiritus sancti. Revelatione etiam data et fide suscepta, semper Trinitatis mysterium ipsius fidei velamine contectum et quadam quasi caligine obvolutum manet, quamdiu peregrinamur a Domino.

I. De exsistentia l'erbi in divinis.

Diximus distinctionem realem esse de formali ratione verbi. Ex alia vero parte semper analogiam proportionalitatis pro priae supposuimus, comparantes Verbum Dei isti conceptioni intellectus nostri. Haec vero duo simul enuntiata, vera analogia, et distinctio realis in ipsa analoga ratione contenta, fidei supernaturali derogare videntur. Notissimum est enim principium illud theodiceae, omnem perfectionem quae in creaturis invenitur, praeexsistere oportere in Deo, idque iuxta modum eminentiorem quidem, sed tamen vere ac proprie seu formaliter, si agatur de perfectione simpliciter perfecta, ut sunt esse et unum, verum et bonum. Verbum igitur, cum dicat perfectionem simplicem, Deo formaliter tribuimus; et cum distinctionem realem contineat, statim colligimus, esse in Deo distinctionem realem Verbi et dicentis Verbum. Praeterea, cum omne quod inest Deo, sit Deus et totus Deus, inferimus esse in Deo duas res subsistentes, duas Personas, Patrem et Filium: ecce mysterium divinae Generationis ex ratione naturali demonstravimus: quod absit ut concedatur.

Theologi ergo duo effugia adhibere solent, ad istam conclusionem vitandam. Aut enim negant distinctionem realem esse de formali ratione verbi, et argumentum praedictum ad hoc tantum pervenire contendunt, ut constet esse in Deo “verbum essentiale, non vero personale (cf. v. g. Hugon, De Deo Trino p. 396, Penido, Le rôle de l' Analogie en Théologie dogmatique, p. 273, p. 312), quod effugium in secundo nostro capitulo efficaciter removisse nobis videmur; aut negant, divinam Trinitatem vere analogice in mente humana repraesentari. Hoc alterum effugium aliquod fundamentum in doctrina S. Thomae habere videtur, qui scribit: Creaturae ducunt in Dei cognitionem sicut effectus in causam. Hoc igitur solum ratione naturali de Deo cognosci potest, quod competere ei necesse est, secundum quod est omnium entium principium... Virtus autem creativa Dei est communis toti Trinitati; unde pertinet ad unitatem essentiae, non ad distinctionem Personarum. Per rationem igitur naturalem cognosci possunt de Deo ea quae pertinent ad unitatem essentiae, non autem ea quae pertinent ad di stinctionem Personarum (I, Q. 32, art. 1).

Respondeat ipse S. Thomas postea scribens: Distinctio divinarum Personarum non est nisi secundum originem, vel potius secundum relationes originis. Non autem est idem modus originis in omnibus, sed modus originis uniuscuiusque est secundum convenientiam suae naturae... Unde manifestum est, quod DISTINCTIO DIVINARUM PERSONARUM EST SECUNDUM QUOD DIVINAR NATURAE CONVENIT. UNDE ESSE AD IMAGINEM DEI SECUNDUM IMITATIONEM DIVINAE NATURAE NON EXCLUDIT HOC QUOD EST ESSE AD IMAGINEM DEI SECUNDUM REPRAESENTATIONEM TRIUM PERSONARUM SED MAGIS UNUM AD ALTERUM SEQUITUR, (2.93, arl. 5).

Et quod specialiter attinet ad analogiam verbi, S. Thomas expresse dicit: Verbum cordis quod nihil est aliud quam id quod actu consideratur per intellectum, PROPRIE de Deo di citur, quia est omnino remotum a materialitate et omni defectu, et huiusmodi proprie dicuntur de Deo, sicut scientia et scitum, intelligere et intellectum, (De Veritate. Q. 4, art. 1). Verbum aeternum comparatur verbo cordis secundum veram rationem verbo interioris, et ideo VERBUM DICITUR UTROBIQUE PROPRIE ». (Ib. ad 12). Imo usque ter in eodem articulo repetit, quod Verbum PROPRIISSIME in Deo dicitur (Ib., 2 et 4 et 6, Sed Contra).

Maneat ergo analogia, maneat et distinctio realis in ipsa analoga ratione importata. Qui vero putat ita divinam Generationem demonstrari, audiat S. Thomam disputantem secum:

Tu verbum dicis perfectionem simplicem. Ego illud mo dum quemdam perfectionis simplicis appello, scilicet ipsius intelligere. Nam dicere non solum importat intelligere, sed intelligere cum hoc quod est de se exprimere aliquam conceptionem, (De Veritate, Q. 4 art. 2 ad 5). Et exinde sic arguo: • Licet ratio naturalis possit pervenire ad ostendendum, quod Deus sit intellectus, MODUM tamen intelligendi non potest invenire sufficienter. Sicut enim de Deo scire possumus quod est, sed non quid est: ita de Deo scire possumusiquod intelligit, sed non quomodo intelligit. Habere autem conceptionem in intelli gendo pertinet ad MODUM intelligendi. Unde ratio haec sufficien ter probare non potest, sed ex eo quod est in nobis aliqualiter per simile coniecturare. (De Potentia Q. 8, art. 1 ad 12).

 Sed merito instabit: Iste modus intelligendi, quo intelligens ex se exprimit aliquam conceptionem, aut est modus. potentialis, aut est et ipse perfectio simplex. Si prius, Deo convenire nequit, et fides affirmaret quod ratio negat; si alterum, in Deo esse efficaciter probatur, et ita semper mysterium per rationem naturalem investigari poterit.

S. Thomas vero dilemma istud simpliciter non accipiet. Modus enim dictionis non est modus potentialis, sed dicit foecunditatem et per consequens actualitatem: Communicatio enim sequitur rationem actus: unde omnis forma, quantum est de se, communicabilis est, et IDEO COMMUNICATIO PERTINET AD NOBILITATEM, (I Sent., d. 4. Q. 1, art. 1). Dictio ergo est perfectio simplex: ita tamen, ut ubicumque in creaturis inveniatur et a nobis comperiatur, potentialitati cuidam alligetur, a qua separari omnino non posse nobis videatur. Nam propterea intelligibile intra nos concipimus, quia ab immediata eius intuitione prohibemur, idque ob potentialitatem obiecti, quod, nisi sit purisimum lumen intellectuale, intellectionem immediate terminare non potest, neque intra actualissimam illam scintillam intrare quae est cognitio intelligibilis. Et ideo omne intelligere in nobis, proprie loguendo, est dicere. Sed Deus omnia cognoscit in Essentia sua, quae est ipsum suum intelligere et sua veritas: unde etiam visione immediata attingi potest, sicut revera sine dictione verbi intelligitur a Filio et a Spiritu Sancto et etiam a Beatis qui Deum vident. Non igitur principium contradictionis vetat, quominus esse in Deo Verbum dicamus, sed principium rationis sufficientis impedit, quominus incertum tamquam certuin affirmemus. Non absurda rationi naturali videtur Generatio Verbi in divinis, sed supervacua. Utquid Verbum diceret, cui esse et intelligere et intellectum sunt idem omnibus modis? Hoc ponere non valemus, nisi Deus ipse revelet, ob aliam causam, nobis ignotam, esse in illo istam abundantiam intellectionis qua Verbum procedit, scilicet quia divina Essentia quam Beati contemplantur id postulat; quia foecunditas ista est proprietas divinae naturae Distinctio divinarum Personarum est secundum quod divinae naturae convenit. Cum ergo divina Essentia nos lateat, oportet ut mysterium divinae Generationis per fidem a scientia Dei et Beatorum accipiamus et tamquam principium indiscussum simpliciter credamus; nam • sacra doctrina est scientia, quae pro cedit ex principiis notis lumine superioris scientiae, quae sci licet est scientia Dei e Beatorum. (I, Q. 1, art. 2). Ecce igitur ad ultimum vera et unica ratio, quare illud divinum mysterium per rationem naturalem cognosci non potest: ignorantia nostra circa causam vel necessitatem vel finalitatem, ut ita loqui liceat, foecunditatis divini intelligere, quia Deus est ipsum suum intelligere et ipsum suum obiectum intellectum:

• Omne intelligere in nobis, proprie loquendo, est dicere: sed Deus potest intelligere sine hoc quod aliquid ex ipso pro cedat secundum rem, QUIA IN EO IDEM EST INTELLECTUS ET INTELLECTUM ET INTELLIGERE, (De Veritate, Q. 4, art. 2, ad 5)

Potentiam intellectivam esse primam potentiarum, satis naturali ratione considerari potest, non autem hanc potentiam intellectivam esse potentiam generativam. CUM ENIM IN DEO SIT IDEM INTELLIGENS ET INTELLIGERE ET INTELLECTUM, RATIO ΝΑ TURALIS NON COGIT PONERE QUOD DEUS, INTELLIGENDO, ALIQUID GIGNAT A SE DISTINCTUM, (De Veritate, Q. 10, art. 13, ad 2). IN DEO IDEM EST INTELLECTUS ET INTELLECTUM, ET IDEO non oportet quod ex hoc quod intelligit, ponatur in eo aliquid conceptum realiter distinctum ab ipso, sicut est in nobis: Trinitas autem Personarum requirit distinctionem realem, (Super Boetium de Trinitate, Q. 1, art. 4, ad 6).

2. De exsistentia Amoris procedentis.

Processio etiam amoris, quamvis sit perfectio simplex, cum ex foecunditate et abundantia et actualitate charitatis proveniat, tamen et ipsa simili potentialitati inseparabiliter alligatur, ubicumque a nobis in creaturis invenitur. Qui enim anhelat et aspirat in bonum amatum, bono adhuc caret; nam qui bonum possidet, ipsi adhaeret eoque fruitur. Iam vero divina Voluntas non appetit bonum quo careat, sed quiescit in Bono quae est ipsamet divina Essentia. Quis ergo in illa tranquilla fruitione Boni processionem ponere auderet < secundum rationem impellentis et moventis in aliquid?. Q. 27, art. 4). Utquid Deus, cum amat seipsum, aspiraret Spiritum, quo nomine quaedam vitalis motio et impulsio designatur, prout aliquis ex amore dicitur moveri vel impelli ad aliud faciendum?, (ib.). Quid facit aspiratio et gemitus, ubi nullum est desiderium? Et tamen, si processionem Spiritus Sancti quoad ipsam substantiam et modum actus consideras, est vera aspiratio, si praesentiam obiecti spectas, non est desiderium. Talem ergo processionem nemo ponere potuisset, nisi iterum ipse Deus revelasset, divinam Essentiam id postulare, quam nullus umquam mortalis homo vidit, sed nec videre potest. Fides igitur eaque sola exsistentiam illius mysterii nobis testificatur, et aliqualem simul conceptionem eius nobis impertit. Rationem vero et necessitatem nec fides aperit, cum divinam Es sentiam nobis palam ostendere non valeat.

3De implicita revelatione nominum Verbi et Amoris.

Quaereret forsitan aliquis, utrum explicita revelatio nominis Verbi requiratur, ad hoc ut generationem intelligibilem in Deo ponamus an revelatio nominis Filii sufficiat? Et eadem quaestio circa alteram processionem utilius etiam recurreret, nam sicut dicit S. Augustinus: Non dixit Scriptura, Spiritus Sanctus Charitas est. Quod si dixisset, non parvam partem quaestionis istius abstulisset. (XV Trin. 16).

Respondendum censemus, totum Trinitatis mysterium, prout hic a nobis in terris degentibus cognosci potest, in illa sacratissima formula virtualiter contineri, qua nos credere profitemur in Deum Patrem Omnipotentem, et in lesum Christum, Filium eius Unicum, et in Spiritum Sanctum.

Ratio enim naturalis quamdam vitam in Deo ponit, duasque operationes vitales, cum Deus seipsum et intelligat et amet. Fides vero cum tria praedicta nomina ponat, et ipsa duas operationes vitales ponit: ubi enim est Filius, est generatio, et ubi est Spiritus, est spiratio. Iam vero vita quam revelatio ponit non debet nec potest extra lineam intellectualem, extra vitam quam ratio naturalis ponit, concipi, ne duas vitas virtualiter distinctas in Deo ponamus atque adeo compositionem metaphysicam seu praecisionem perfectam Perfectionis a Perfectione, sicut in anima humana perfecte praescinduntur animalitas et intellectualitas: talem enim distinctionem virtualem maiorem Simplicitas divina excludit, sicut in theodicea probari solet. Et quod Relatio ab Essentia perfecte praescindit, ideo non repugnat, quia Relatio praecise qua Relatio et ex adesse quod dicit, nullam positivam ponit perfectionem. Una ergo est divina Vita, et re et ratione: nec aliud erunt divina mysteria quae fides docet, nisi modi illius vitae quam ratio naturalis esse in Deo probat. Modi autem qui rationem naturalem latent, sunt reales processiones, est foecunditas ex qua procedunt divinae Personae.

Aliis verbis: fide sola mysterium tenemus, ratione vero theologica efficaciter demonstramus, processiones, si quae sint in Deo, necessario secundum intellectum et voluntatem exsistere: Processiones in divinis ACCIPI NON POSSUNT NISI SECUNDUM ACTIONES QUAE IN AGENTE MANENT. HUIUSMODI AUTEM ACTIONES IN NATURA INTELLECTUALI ET DIVINA NON SUNT NISI DUAE SCILICET INTELLIGERE ET VELLE... Relinquitur igitur, quod nulla alia processio possit esse in Deo nisi Verbi et Amoris, (I", Q. 27, art. 5 of De Potentia, Q. 9, art. 9).

4. De ineffabilitate divini Verbi et divini Amoris.

Non solum exsistentiam mysterii non probavimus, verum etiam fide tradita ipsum mysterium divinae ineffabilitatis manet caligine obtectum. Nam conceptionem quidem et intelligentiam defendimus, sed analogicam utique, id est per speculum in aenigmate non facie ad faciem. Ipsam rationem significatam verbi et amoris concipimus, modum vero divinum significandi nonnisi negative attingimus. Ad modum istum ineffabilem tria praecipue spectant:

1º Subsistentia et personalitas Verbi et Amoris in Deo: nam in nobis verbum et amor sunt accidentia. Et hic simul etiam tangis praecellentiam nominis Filii super nomen Verbi, cum ratio filii positive dicat subsistentiam, subsistentia vero verbi ad modum divinum pertineat. Unde et Pius VI in pseudosynodo Pistoriensi improbat, quod de ipsismet tribus Personis tradit, eas secundum earum proprietates personales et incommunicabiles exactius loquendo exprimi seu appellari Patrem, VERBUM et Spiritum Sanctum: quasi minus propria et exacta foret appellatio FILM, tot Scripturae locis consecrata, voce ipsa Patris e coelis et e nube delapsa, tum formula baptismi a Christo praescripta, tum et praeclara illa confessione qua beatus ab ipsomet Christo Petrus est pronuntiatus». (Denz. 1597).

2º Unitas Verbi et unitas Amoris: nos enim pro successiva actuum serie plura verba concipimus et multos gemitus aspiramus. Secus autem est in Deo: Cum Deus omnia uno intuitu per suum intellectum comprehendat, et similiter uno actu voluntatis omnia diligat, impossibile est in Deo esse plura Verba aut plures Amores. Si igitur Filius procedit ut Verbum et Spiritus Sanctus procedit ut Amor, impossibile est in Deo esse plures Filios vel plures Spiritus Sanctos, (Compen dium, c. 56).

3º Activa intellectio Verbi, activus item Amor Spiritus Sancti. Nostrum enim verbum intelligitur quidem, i. e. expri mitur, non vero intelligit: et hoc ideo, quia natura quam re cipit, intellectionem scilicet foecundam sed accidentalem, non est subiectum intelligens sed id quo quis intelligit. Divinum vero intelligere, cum subsistat, est subiectum intelligens. Unde omne suppositum illam divinam naturam participans, Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, active intelligit, non triplici intellectione sed una eademque. Verbum autem est quidem intelligens non ut producens Verbum, sed ut Verbum procedens, prout scilicet in Deo Verbum procedens secundum rem non differt ab intellectu divino, sed relatione sola distinguitur a principio Verbi (I Q. 34, art. 2 ad 4, cf. art. 1 ad 3). Verbum ergo habet idem intelligere quod Pater habet, sed Pater habet cum relatione Paternitatis seu cum foecunditate et dictione, Filius autem cum relatione Filiationis, qua dicitur et procedit a Patre. Spiritus vero Sanctus habet etiam idem intelligere subsistens, sed sine ulla relatione in linea intellectuali, cum illud habeat solummodo in quantum est Patri et Filio consubstanlialis. Et similiter est de Amore. Nam tres divinae Personae eodem Amore idem divinum Bonum amant. Sed ille Amor est in Patre et Filio cum modo activo foecunditatis seu cum relatione Spirationis, in Spiritu Sancto vero cum modo passivo seu cum relatione Processionis.

Haec omnia valde ineffabilia, nec aliter quam per viam negationis et remotionis a nobis attinguntur. Sed ineffabilior, si fieri potest, est ipsa illa altissima ratio et quasi causa my. sterii Trinitatis, illud scilicet propter quod in Deo est generatio Verbi et processio Amoris; illa necessitas, quam Beati in Deo contemplantur: Summa Bonitas Dei, secundum modum quo nunc intelligitur per effectus, potest intelligi absque  Trinitate Personarum; sed secundum quod intelligitur in seipsa, prout videtur a Beatis, non potest intelligi absque Trinitate Personarum, (II, II, Q. 2, art. 8 ad 3). Illud enim altissimum principium, uti diximus, nihil est aliud nisi ipsa divina, Essentia, quae postulat, ut Deus sit Unus et Trinus, est ipse demum ineffabilis Deus, in quo omnis sermo deficit. Unde sit Ipse nobis finis dicendi.

Te ergo quaeso, Domine, (ut precationem Servi tui Augustini usurpare liceat, qua ipse orans suos de Trinitate libros absolvit), Domine Deus Unus, Deus Trinitas, quaecumque dixi, in his pagellis de tuo, agnoscant et tui, si qua de meo, et Tu ignosce et tui. Amen >.

 

 

 

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[1] Ici encore on aurait tort d'exiger de nous une preuve déductive pour établir ce qui est évident en soi. Un peu de réflexion et la comparaison entre ces deux notions d'adhésion et d'aspiration doivent suffire pour faire éclater au grand jour ce caractère si original de l'aspiration, qui est un acte fécond, produisant un souffle qu'il est lui-même. Aussi, tout comme pour la notion de diction, nous bornons-nous à faire appel au sens commun, en tant qu'il se reflète dans la grammaire, qui est presque toujours un fidèle écho de la réalité. S. Thomas dit à propos du magistère: In actu docendi invenimus duplicem materiam, in cuius signum etiam actus docendi duplici accusativo coniungitur. (De Veritate Q. 11 art. 4). Nous pouvons dire ici exactement la même chose les actes de diction et d'aspiration ont chacun deux matières la diction exprime une parole et exprime un objet; l'aspiration aspire un souffle et aspire vers un objet. Aussi les deux verbes dicere et aspirare sont-ils conjugués avec deux ac cusatifs, et cette propriété grammaticale est un signe de ce que nous aimons appeler la fécondité des actes. Toute notre thèse est là.

De Analogica Nostra Sanctissimae Trinitatis Conceptione

 

H. DIEPEN O. S. B.

De Analogica Nostra Sanctissimae Trinitatis Conceptione[1]

I. De proposito huius commentationis.

Non totum tractatum de Deo Trino istis pagellis revolvendum suscipimus, sed tamen cardinem ipsius: praecipuum namque difficultatis punctum examinare intendimus, qui circa hoc omnium altissimum mysterium versatur: de modo scilicet agemus, quo consubstantialitas divinarum Personarum in una eademque numero Essentia a nobis cognosci vel forte etiam concipi aliqualiter possit.

Diversimode autem quaestio nobis sese offert, cum dupliciter ex illo divino mysterio contradictio et paradoxon oriri nobis videntur: nam et principio contradictionis et principio comparatae identitatis numericam plurium unitatem repugnare aestimare possemus.

Tres sunt in Deo, Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus: quomodo unus Deus? Una et individua est divina Natura, non unitate illa universalium, qua omnes homines sunt unus homo, sed unitate numerica ac veri nominis identitate: siquidem una quaedam summa res est, quae veraciter est Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, ut dicit IV Concilium Lateranense (Denz., 432). Quomodo ergo manent tres Personae? Quae tandem ista distinctioni sociata identitas? Nonne apertissime principio contradictionis repugnat illa unitas et non-unitas, distinctio et non-distinctio?

En vero alterum dubium, seu potius idem dubium aliter propositum: Pater est vere divina Essentia, item Filius est eadem divina Essentia, et tamen distinguuntur secundum rem, qui uni tertio realiter identificantur. Tritum est enim hoc quod dicunt principium identitatis comparatae: Quaecumque uni et eidem sunt eadem, sibi invicem sunt eadem. Tam inextricabilis quibusdam iste nodus visus est, ut desperatissimam amplexi sententiam, transcendentiam huius principii ipsiusque naturalis humanae mentis luminis in dubium revocare veriti non sint. Sunt namque, qui diserte contendunt, illud principium, Quaecumque uni etc., si in tota abstractione et analogia entis sumatur, abstrahendo ab ente creato et increato seu finito et infinito, esse falsum (cf. Suarez, De Trinitate, lib. IV, c. 3).

Merito istam sententiam reiiciunt communiter auctores, et ostendunt cum S. Thoma, nullam repugnantiam adesse, quia idem affirmatur quidem et negatur de eodem, at non sub eodem respectu. Essentia enim divina est quid absolutum, simul autem infinitate sua etiam relativum genus continet. Identitas dicitur secundum absolutum, distinctio vero secundum relativum, quod quamvis ab absoluto realiter non sit diversum, virtualiter tamen, imo secundum praecisionem rationis perfectam (cf. Billot, De Deo Trino, thes. VII) ab eo distinguitur. Sic nullatenus implicat, quod Pater et Filius sunt unum quidscilicet secundum absolutum genus, et quod tamen distinguun, tur, videlicet secundum relationum oppositionem.

Verissimus iste discursus, et omnino necessarius ad repugnantiam, quae apparet, auferendam. Et tamen, numquid sa tisfacere ei poterit, qui quaerit non tantum auferre repugnantiam, sed insuper, salva fide et reverentia huius augustissimi mysterii, CONCIPERE aliqualiter seu analogice VIDERE processionem tam immanentem, ut procedens a producente nonnisi relative distinguatur? Numquid enim assentire debemus his, quae dicunt nonnulli: in ordinem Logicae formalis deportandum esse dubium et regulis huius scientiae quasi mathematice dirimendum? (Cf. Michel DTC art. Relations, col. 2155) Numquid dicemus, repugnantiam fuisse evidentem, si ageretur de relativo inhaerente, nunc autem repugnantiam non adeo esse evidentem, ut, si fides exigat, Relationes realiter oppositae in Deo non possint admitti? (Cf. Galtier, De Trinitate, p. 199).

Audaciae forsitan alicui hae quaestiones viderentur, et legem analogiae pronuntiabit: Positive nequimus concipere, nisi ipsam formalissimam analogam rationem, abstrahentem a modo creato vel increato; ea tantum analogico conceptu apprehendere valemus, cuius exemplum in creatis praecessit: modus divinus a nostra cognitione quam longissime avolat, negative et per viam remotionis attingitur. Identitatem vero si dicis, distinctioni sociatam, istum modum excellentem dixisti, immanentia tam intima est Deo propria, in ea praecise est ratio mysterii reposita: In Deo namque, ait Ioannes a S. Thoma, distinguuntur extrema penes relativam oppositionem tantum, apud nos autem verbum procedens, etiam quando ex plena intelligentia procedit, non in sola relatione consistit. (In I^um Q. 27, disp. 12, art. 4 n. 29). Iteratoque idem auctor exponit, quomodo in intellectu creato non sit nisi imitatio quaedam illius admirabilis unitatis, quam fides in Deo agnoscit; quomodo identitas extremorum nullatenus habeatur in mente humana, sed solummodo inclinatio atque tendentia in unitatem numericam: In processione intelligibili id quod procedit ex vi ipsius processionis PETIT unitatem eamdem numero cum obiecto a quo paritur et procedit. Petit, inquam, unitatem in esse intelligibili, et ulterius inde potest inferri, quod sit unitas in substantia et perfectione, quando esse intelligibile ad substantiam pertinet, ut in Deo (Ib., n. 31, cf. art. 6 eiusdem disp. per totum).

Verissimum et hoc: nam absurdissime homo intellectus homini seipsum intelligenti consubstantialis diceretur; Deus vero intellectus a Deo seipsum intelligente, est Filius natus a Patre, eamdemque numero habens divinam naturam, nam in Deo solo esse est intelligere. Et ita videtur, quod temere positiva conceptio divinae consubstantialitatis quaeratur.

Temere ergo eam S. Augustinus quaesivit? Hanc ergo Trinitatem quod est Deus, ait, quomodo INTELLIGIMUS esse Trinitatem? Non dixi: quomodo credemus? nam hoc inter fideles non debet habere quaestionem. Sed si aliquo modo per intelligentiam possumus VIDERE QUOD CREDIMUS, quis iste erit modus? (XV Trin. 6). Et quod peius est, temere et inaniter se invenisse gratulatus est: dicit namque: Quisquis potest intelligere verbum, non solum antequam sonet, verum etiam antequam sonorum eius imagines cogitatione volvantur: hoc enim est quod ad nullam pertinet linguam, eorum scilicet quae linguae appellantur gentium, quarum nostra latina est; quisquis, inquam, hoc intelligere potest, iam potest videre per hoc speculum atque in hoc aenigmate aliquam Verbi illius similitudinem de quo dictum est: In principio erat Verbum, (ib. 16). Et ut multas alias S. Augustini aliorumque Doctorum praetereamus sententias, nonne Angelicus Doctor veram analogicam conceptionem huius mysterii sibi pollicitus est? His igitur consideratis, ait, utcumque CONCIPERE possumus, QUALITER sit divina generatio accipienda, (IV C. G., c. 11). Haec igitur sunt, quae de generatione divina, e sacris Scripturis edocti, utcumque CONCIPERE possumus, (Ib., c. 13), Huius autem communicationis exemplum in operatione intellectus CONGRUENTISSIME INVENITUR. Nam ipsa divina Natura spiritualis est, unde per exempla spiritalia melius manifestatur, (De Potentia, Q. 2, art. 1). Exitus Fi lii a Patre est secundum modum processionis interioris prout verbum exit a corde et manet in eo: UNDE EXITUS ISTE IN DIVIVINIS EST SECUNDUM SOLAM DISTINCTIONEM RELATIONUM, NON SECUNDUM ESSENTIALEM ALIQUAM DISTANTIAM, (1° Q. 42, art. 5 ad 2). Nonne haec et multa huiusmodi id saltem innuunt, id redolent, mysterium Trinitatis suapte natura intellectum quidem creatum excedere, non vero perplexitate sua sed prae nimia pulchritudine?

Et revera, qui multum diligenter inspexerit quae scripsit S. Thomas de Trinitatis mysterio, haud dubium quin comperiat, identitatem extremorum quae tamen realiter opponuntur etiam in creatis inveniri. Aestimat S. Thomas quod Unus Trinusque Creator congruentissimam sui in creatione reliquit imaginem, consubstantialitatem divinam utcumque sed vere referentem, mentem scilicet humanam, ubi habentur processiones verbi et amoris revera immanentes. Qui ergo scripta S. Thomae assidue meditaverit, inveniet in seipso quoddam generans, et inde generatam prolem mentis, quin tamen generans et nascens ab invicem secundum absolutum genus differant. In analogia vero verbi sui ad Verbum Patris maxima diligentia notabit, (haec est enim summa quaestionis), quae sint extrema ad invicem opposita, quid sit pariens, quid nascens. Non tam obiectum pariens dicet, neque subiectum intelligens, quamvis dici possint et ab ipso S. Thoma interdum dicantur: tamen ut consubstantialitatem divinam cum S. Thoma aliqualiter concipere valeat, ipsam notitiam actualem parientem considerabit, et inveniet, intelligere et verbum non esse duas qualitates, sed unam dumtaxat, et tamen esse duas res, notitiam et verbum, ad invicem non quidem conSUBSTANTiales, cum sint quoddam accidens, sed tamen ita veraciter CoESSENTiales. convenientes scilicet in uno intelligere foecundo, ut de tali immanentia analogice et proinde aliqualiter positive concipi possit ipsa immanens in foecundo sinu Patris Nativitas Filii Dei. Et progrediens tunc ulterius, facile etiam spiramen amoris in se deteget, spiranti amori item coessentiale atque utcumque immanentem processionem Spiritus Sancti a Patre et Filio repraesentans [2].

Quam sententim, ut ex auctoritate S. Thomae atque ex ratione theologica valide demonstremus, primo in analogia verbi nostri distinctionem realem quaeremus, deinde unitatem immanentiae, ut postea utrumque, i. e. distinctionem et unitatem in analogia amoris etiam inveniri ostendamus. Sed ne eminentiam divini mysterii ita laesisse vel minuisse videamur, pau ca etiam addemus de modo quo exsistentia Trinitatis a nobis cognosci potest, i. e. per solam Revelationem, dicemusque quare mysterium, Revelatione tradita, ineffabile semper remaneat. Unde quattuor capitulis totum propositum complectemur; quo autem facilius legantur, unumquodque capitulum suam doctrinam per modum theseos praefixam habebit.

II. De nomine

Verbi quatenus distinctionem personalem dicit.

Thesis. Verbum cordis a notitia actuali ipsum dicente non ratione potentialitatis adiunctae sed ex ipsa sua formalissima ratione tam necessario realiter distinguitur, ut qui in Deo poneret Verbum, eo ipso poneret Personam distinctam a Patre.

Ista sententia est communis thomistarum, et defenditur ab eis contra Suarez[3]. Hic enim dictionem mentalem seu prolationem verbi, ac si esset productio intellectionis considerat; ipsum vero intelligere verbum appellat, seu potius informationem passivam intellectus a verbo. Dicit namque: In nobis advertere oportet, hanc vocem intelligere posse esse ambiguam Nam potest praecise significare producere actum intelligendi, vel recipere illum seu informari illo, iuxta illud Aristotelis, Intelligere est quoddam pati. Vel certe potest illa vox utrumque complecti, quia intelligere dicit actum immanentem, qui et producitur et recipitur in agente. Si ergo primo modo accipimus intelligere in nobis, sic revera non distinguuntur intelligere et dicere mentaliter. Nam iuxta sententiam quam ego suppono et existimo omnino veram, VERBUM MENTALE IN NOBIS NIHIL EST ALIUD QUAM ACTUS INTELLIGENDI IN FACTO ESSE, qui etiam conceptus et notitia dicitur. Ergo dicere mentaliter nihil aliud est quam producere ipsum intelligendi actum; ergo est idem quod intelligere sumptum praecise pro actione. Quia vero frequenter sumitur intelligere pro ipsa obiecti perceptione. ideo communiter includit informationem ipsius actus intelligendi, et hoc modo distin guitur in nobis ex natura rei ab ipso dicere. Nam dicere tantum est agere seu producere verbum, intelligere vero formaliter diçit informari vitaliter ipso verbo, quae duo ex natura rei diversa sunt, ut ex philosophia suppono, (De Trinitate, l. 1. c. 7, n. 5).

In duobus autem aestimamus Suarez deceptum fuisse quorum prius est, quod in intelligere nostro non distinguit inter ipsam formalem intelligendi rationem, et potentialitatem quae intellectioni creatae convenit. Non enim emanatio actus spiritualis a potentia ad rationem formalem intelligendi pertinet, sed est modus deficiens, qui nonnisi creaturis convenire potest: est exitus de potentia in actum; ut taceamus hoc quod illam emanationem productionem appellat: non enim intellectus possibilis producit in se intelligere, sed intellectus agens illustratione phantasmatum et reverberatione sui luminis ex phantasmatibus, intellectum possibilem actuat atque in intellectionem provocat.

Alterum in quo Suarez deceptum fuisse opinamur, est celebre illud: Intelligere est quoddam pati, quod nimis ad literam sumpsit. Actualitatem vitalem intellectionis non percipiens, etsi ore pronuntians, illam scilicet apprehensionem obiecti qua intelligens, in se manens, quodammodo extra se egreditur, (sed longe aliter quam actio praedicamentalis quae est in passo): multo minus ultra ipsum intelligere terminum ab illo expressum atque formatum, cogitare potuit.

Haec autem omnia facile patebunt, cum genuinam intellectionis rationem a sensu communi acceperimus. Non enim a priore procedendum est, nec principia philosophica inconsulto promendo, quae, nisi in sua origine logica contemplentur, atque ad sua rursus principia examinentur, prave omnino intelligantur necesse est.

Sensus autem communis infallibili suo instinctu hoc sentit, intelligere esse QUODDAM VIDERE, eodemque modo intellectum ad veritatem, quo oculum ad colorem referri. Nec mirum, quia in creatione Dei valde bona, inferiora semper superiorum imaginem retinent. Et quamvis perfectiora sint spiritualia ideoque quoad seipsa magis intelligibilia, tamen, ut apte notat S. Augustinus: Illo ipso ordine conditionis nostrae, quo mortales atque carnales effecti sumus, facilius et quasi familiarius visibilia quam intelligibilia tractamus, (XI Trin. 1). Quare autem inter ceteros sentiendi modos magis visio corporalis interroganda sit, idem ibidem declarat S. Doctor: Potissimum testimonio utamur oculorum: is enim sensus corporis maxime excellit, et est visioni mentis pro sui generis diversitate vicinior..

Duo autem maximi momenti de hac analogia statim colligere licebit: primo quidem, intellectionem esse vitalem apprehensionem obiecti, non passivam ab illo informationem, et tali modo intelligi debere axioma de intellectione patiente, ut passio concipiatur praesuppositive ad formalem intelligendi rationem. Deinde vero, intellectionem duobus modis fieri posse, ita scilicet ut obiectum aut directe attingatur, aut mediante termino expresso, qui verbum mentale dicitur. Cum vero haec duo statuerimus, statim inde tertio colligere poterimus, et verbum realiter ab intellectione differre, et distinctionem istam ad ipsam formalem rationem verbi pertinere: ita ut qui in Deo poneret Verbum, eo ipso poneret generationem intelligibilem et duas Personas realiter distinctas, Patrem generantem, nascentem vero Filium.

I. De vitalitate intellectionis.

Nonne quotidie experimur, visionem non esse passivam informationem, sed oculos active quasi a se egredi, ut obiectum contemplentur et circa illud versentur? Omnino mirabile illud S. Augustino videbatur: Quomodo anima quae sunt extra carnem suam sentit, quae nonnisi in carne sua vivit? Annon ab eius carne longissime absunt sidera in coelo? annon in coelo videt solem? an et in coelo vivit, quia et in coelo sentit, et sensus esse non potest, ubi vita non est? (Ep. 137, 2). Et utique actus visionis aliud inhaesionis subiectum non habet nisi potentiam visivam; non enim sicut actio est in passo, i. e, entitative, ita et visio est in obiecto. Obiectum non patitur a vidente, quinimo non realiter ad ipsum refertur sed secundum rationem tantum. Et nihilominus oculus in videndo, actualitate sua formas sive colores apprehendit, et hoc modo in seipso manens, alia a se occupat atque arripit. Quare et S. Thomas loquitur de actu videntis, secundum quod EXIT a vidente», (I Q. 8, art. 4 ad 6).

Neque tamen propterea negamus, quominus in vidente habeatur informatio passiva a viso, sed negamus, visionem formaliter illa informatione constitui; negamus etiam sensum communem statim illam informationem experiri; et dicimus cum thomistis, informationem et passionem se habere praesuppositive ad visionem, nec aliter quam a ratione reflexa posse explorari.

Ut enim hoc non illud videam, i. e. ut hac visione taliter specificata utar seu operer, oportet penes me habeam speci ficationem apprehendendam, quia quale est unumquodque, ta lia operatur (I C. G., 53, § Ulterius). Forma igitur visi non tantum terminat visionem, quod in visione corporali experimur, sed etiam ut principium et radix eiusdem visionis se habet, quod philosophice statuimus.

Potentia igitur, ut eliciat actum suum, informari debet  “specie impressa” seu ipsa forma visibili; sed visio non consistit in illa passione i. e. receptione speciei, imo est effectus passivae informationis, et formaliter consistit in actione vitali obiectum apprehendendi.

Eodem ergo modo de intellectu iudicemus. Intellectus et ipse vitaliter apprehendit obiectum intellectum, et in hoc consistit formalis ratio intelligendi. At illud supponit, saltem ut. in pluribus, passivam receptionem formae intelligibilis seu speciei impressae, et ipsum intelligere sequitur ad hanc formam intelligibilem, sicut actio transiens sequitur ad quamdam formam accidentalem operantis (ut calefacere ad calorem), et sicut esse naturale sequitur ad formam substantialem. Si vero intellectus iam tali forma intelligibili formatus est, (sicut intellectus angelicus est ad sui cognitionem naturaliter determinatus, connaturaliter vero, i. e. per species infusas ad totum ordinem universi cognoscendum), tunc sine ulla passione completur huiusmodi perfecta intellectio. Ex quo patet, passionem non tantum praesuppositive sed et accidentaliter se habere ad formalem intelligendi rationem.

Quae diximus ipsius S. Thomae, imo et thomistarum esse sententiam, nunc paucis ostendamus.

• In tantum ipsum intelligere, ait S. Thomas, specificatur per obiectum suum, in quantum forma intelligibilis est principium intellectualis operationis. Nam omnis operatio specificatur per formam, quae est principium operationis, sicut calefactio per calorem. Unde per illam formam intelligibilem specificatur intellectualis operatio, quae facit intellectum in actu, (I Q. 14, art. 5, ad 3).

• Actio quae manet in agente... consequitur unionem obiecti cum agente. Ex hoc enim quod intellectum fit unum cum intelligente, consequitur intelligere quasi quidam effectus differens ab utroque (Q. 54, art. 1, ad 3).

• In actione quae manet in agente oportet, ad hoc quod proredat actio, quod obiectum uniatur agenti, sicut oportet quod sen sibile uniatur sensui, ad hoc quod sential actu. Et ita se habet obiectum unitum potentiae ad huiusmodi actionem, sicut forma quae est principium actionis in aliis agentibus. Sicut enim calor est principium formale calefactionis, ita SPECIES REI VISAE EST PRINCIPIUM FORMALE VISIONIS IN OCULO. Sed considerandum est, quod huiusmodi species obiecti qaandoque est in potentia tantum in cognoscitiva virtute, et tunc est cognoscens in potentia tantum; et ad hoc quod actu cognoscat. requiritur quod potentia cognoscitiva reducatur in actum speciei. Si autem semper eam actu habeat, nihilominus per eam cognoscere potest, absque aliqua mutatione vel receptione praecedenti. Ex quo patet, quod MOVERI AB OBIECTO NON EST DE RATIONE COGNOSCENTIS IN QUANTUM EST COGNOSCENS, SED IN QUANTUM EST POTENTIA COGNOSCENS», (Q. 56, art. 1).

Moveri et pati convenit intellectui secundum quod est in potentia. (Ib., ad 3).

• Intelligens et intellectum, prout ex eis est effectum unum quid, quod est intellectus in actu, sunt unum principium huius actus qui est intelligere... Unde INTELLIGENS NON SE HABET UT AGENS VEL UT PATIENS NISI PER ACCIDENS, (De Veritate, Q. 8, art. 6, c. cf. ad 3, ad 8, ad 11).

• Cognoscens et cognitum non se habent sicut agens et patiens sed sicut duo ex quibus fit unum cognitionis principium (Ib. art. 7, ad 2 in contrarium, cf. art. 8 ad 15).

• Intellectum per se non est similitudo rei intellectae per quam informatur intellectus ad intelligendum. Intellectus enim non potest intelligere nisi secundum quod fit in actu per hanc similitudinem, sicut nihil aliud potest operari secundum quod est in potentia sed secundum quod fit actu per aliquam formam. Haec ergo similitudo se habet in intelligendo sicut intelligendi principium, ut calor est principium calefactionis, non sicut intelligendi terminus. (De Potentia, Q. 9 art. 5).

SIGNIFICAT ENIM IPSUM INTELLIGERE APPREHENSIONEM EIUS QUOD INTELLIGITUR PER INTELLECTUM, (IV C. G. 11 § Mani festum).

E thomistis Ioannes a S. Thoma audiatur: Ad id quod dicitur ex Philosopho, quod intelligere est quoddam pati, dicitur id verificari causaliter et praesuppositive ad intelligere, non formaliter, quia antecedenter ad actum ipsum intelligendi debet intellectus informari obiecto seu specie intelligibili, et sic factus intellectus in actu operatur ACTIVE et emanative ipsum actum intelligendi... Et hic sensus est tam manifestus in ipso Philoso pho, ut mirari satis non possum, viros doctos sic axioma istud accepisse, quod intelligere est quoddam pati, quasi voluerit Phi losophus formalem rationem intelligendi non in operatione emanante, sed in informatione passiva constituere, (In I Q. 27. disp. 17 art. 4, п. 24).

• Formalis ratio vitalitatis non explicatur in ipso actu et in ipso vivente per pati et informari, sed per agere et A SE EMITTERE, quia vitalitas consistit formaliter in se movere. Hoc autem quod est informare et potentiam informari a qualitate. est commune viventi et non viventi. (Ib. art. 5 n. 13).

• Ut aliquis dicatur intelligens, et intellectio ipsa seu intelligere conveniat subiecto, non sufficit informatio et inhaerentia actus vel conceptus, sed requiritur processio et EGRESSIO ACTUS AB OPERANTE... quia intelligere formalissime est actus viventis ut vivens est; vitalitas autem non convenit actui pro ea parte praecise qua inhaeret in vivente, quia hoc passivum est, et passivum non est vitale; sed pro ea parte qua active est a vivente, quia de ratione viventis formalissime est ut moveat se, non ut patiatur. Ergo cum intelligere sit vivere, formalissime erit movere a se, non pati et informari ab obiecto, quatenus APPREHENDIT ILLUD ET FIT UNUM CUM EO... Itaque operatio intellectus... versatur circa obiectum... APPREHENDENDO OBIECTUM ET TRAHENDO AD SE SEU FACIENDO ILLUD UNUM SIHI... Significat enim intelligere apprehendere obiectum, ut ex D. Thoma diximus supra IV C. Gentes, c. 11, (Ib., n. 14).

Ne autem circa pugnas verborum languescamus, in hoc ultimo loco observandum est, quomodo et ipsum intelligere formaliter sumptum possit dici informatio ab obiecto, scilicet, quatenus apprehendit illud. Quod fusius paulo inferius idem auctor ita explicat: Dicitur autem intelligere importare ordinem seu habitudinem informationis, non informationis a qua litate repraesentativa, hoc numquam dixit S. Thomas, sed informationis rei intellectae, quae non est informatio causae formalis intrinsecae sed formalis obiectivae, quae solum informat specificando et tamquam terminus intellectus fit unum apprehensive cum ipso intelligere, seu unum obiective, et HOC FIERI UNUM VOCATUR INFORMATIO, scilicet informatio obiectiva», (Ib.). Unde palam fit, talem informationem nullatenus esse passivam sed maxime activam et vitalem. neque esse contra rationem huiusmodi informationis, quod ulterior terminus, tamquam actus ex actu erumpens, ab eo procedat. De quo termino, i. e. verbo cordis, nunc dicamus.

2. De verbo cordis.

Eadem analogia cum visione corporali utentes, qua, ipsa natura docente, de intellectu spirituali instruimur, facillime illud statuere poterimus, sicut in ordine corporali, ita et in ordine spiritualis intellectionis, duos esse apprehendendi modos.

Alio enim et alio modo qualitates visibiles apprehendimus, tam evidenter inter se distinctas, ut duas potentias visivas ponere, apertissimae sit necessitatis. Modo enim in ipsa re quae extra nos est, colores et figuras apprehendimus, et tunc miro modo ipsum obiectum per se, nulla specie vicaria mediante, terminat visionem. Modo vero totus intra nos visionis processus se evolvit: possumus namque clausis oculis corporis, quibusdam oculis cordis obiectum semel visum interne apprehendere, exprimentes nobismetipsis quod capiamus, simul obiectum apprehendendo et imaginem eius pariendo: et tunc ad talem imaginem seu speciem expressam visio ista interna terminatur. Duo proinde media in tali cognitione po nenda sunt, species impressa et species expressa, cum tamen in priore videndi ratione species impressa tantum habeatur, quam ut principium visionis potentiae impressam supra necessariam esse ostendimus.

Similiter ergo in intellectu duo actuum genera distinguere oportebit, (quare non duas potentias, mox dicemus), actum meri intelligere seu visionis immediatae, qua res extra nos in sua entitate physica et simul in sua ratione intelligibili apprehenditur, et actus conceptionis intellectualis, qua potentia format in seipsa quidditatem rei intellectae atque speciem expressam foecunda parit. Ista species verbum mentis etiam dicitur, nam intellectus loquitur sibi, obiectum sibi dicit: unde et actus conceptionis dictio merito appellatur.

Quos duos modos S. Thomas saepe supponit et quandoque diserte admittit, ut cum dicit: In nobis dicere non solum importat intelligere, sed intelligere cum hoc quod est ex se exprimere aliquam conceptionem, (De Veritate, Q. 4, art. 2 ad 5).

Statim vero advertendum est, actum simplicis visionis intellectualis, ut in pluribus, impediri. Nam res extra nos non sunt actu intelligibiles, sicut colores, accedente lumine, sunt actu visibiles. Neque ipsae etiam essentiae angelicae imme. diate intellectionem terminare possunt: virtualiter tantum implicant proprietates suas; intellectio autem non potest terminari ad quid habituale, sed requirit vividam actualissimamque intentionem, in qua ipsum cognitum fulgide resplendeat. Nam et colores oculo non attinguntur, nisi quatenus eodem lumine perfunduntur quod implet oculum. Ut intelligere terminare possit, nec ipsum absorbeat, eodem gradu actualitatis obiectum fulgeat oportet, quo ipsa intellectio. Unde divina Essentia, quae est ipsum suum lumen intellectuale, (nam in Deo et in eo solo idem est esse et intelligere), visione simplici attingi potest, et a seipso et a Beatis videntibus eam. Et hanc rationem assignat Angelicus, loquens de Angelis: Nondum tamen ad ultimam perfectionem vita ipsorum pertingit, quia, licet intentio intellecta sit eis omnino intrinseca, non tamen ipsa intentio intellecta est eorum substantia, QUIA NON EST, IDEM IN EIS INTELLIGERE ET ESSE. Ultima igitur perfectio vitae competit Deo, IN QUO NON EST ALIUD INTELLIGERE ET ALIUD ESSE, (IV C. G., c. 11).

Omnis igitur intellectio creata, praeter visionem beatam, (quae revera aptissime VISIO, non conceptio appellatur) omnis, inquam, alia intellectio creata fit per modum conceptionis seu dictionis. Unde dicit S. Thomas: Non aliter possumus intelligere, nisi huiusmodi conceptionem exprimendo, et ideo OMNE INTELLIGERE IN NOBIS PROPRIE LOQUENDO EST DICERE. SED DEUS POTEST INTELLIGERE SINE HOC QUOD ALIQUID EX IPSO PROCEDAT SECUNDUM REM, QUIA IN EO IDEM EST INTELLECTUS ET INTELLECTUM ET INTELLIGERE, (De Veritate, Q. 4. art. 2, ad 5).

Hinc explicatur, quare in analogia inter intellectum et sensum, intellectus fere semper comparetur imaginationi, non visioni externae, ut in his verbis S. Thomae: Est enim aliqua cognoscitiva potentia, quae cognoscit tantum recipiendo, non autem ex receptis aliquid formando, sicut sensus simpliciter cognoscit illud cuius speciem recipit et nihil aliud. Aliqua vero potentia est, quae non solum cognoscit secundum quod recipit, sed etiam ex his quae recipit potest aliquam aliam speciem formare, sicut patet in imaginatione, quae ex forma auri recepta et forma montis format phantasma aurei montis. Et similiter est in intellectu, quia ex forma generis et differentiae comprehensa, format quidditatem speciei, (De Veritate, Q. 8, art. 5).

Restat ut breviter indicemus, quare in intellectu duo actuum genera posuerimus, non in parte intellectiva duas potentias, unam visivam, alteram conceptualem. Imaginatio enim a visione externa realiter differt, tum propter maiorem amplitudinem obiecti (nam sonos imaginamur, videre non possumus, et similiter est de aliis sensatis sensuum externorum), tum praecipue propter diversam potentiae habitudinem ad speciem impressam. Sensus enim externus ad eam recipiendam tantum aptus exsistat oportet, imaginatio potius ad retinendam et conservandam. Et quamvis recipere et retinere quoad se ad idem principium reducantur, tamen IN CORPORA LIBUS diversa requirunt principia, sicut dicit S. Thomas: Recipere et retinere reducuntur in corporalibus ad diversa princi pia: nam humida bene recipiunt et male retinent, e contrario autem est de siccis, (1ª Q. 78, art. 4). Hoc ergo respectu-i. e. non attendendo ad maiorem latitudinem obiecti sed comparando tantum imaginationem qualitatum visibilium et visio, nem externam, PER ACCIDENS ET RATIONE CORPOREITATIS diversificantur hae duae potentiae, non per se et ratione diversae cognitionis: Ad rationem enim potentiae passivae pertinet con servare sicut et recipere. (Ib., Q. 79, art. 7.) Quod autem species expressa exprimitur vel non exprimitur, neque hoc aliam et aliam potentiam requirit, sed ex maiore vel minore foecunditate et vi cognitionis intra eamdem lineam explicatur, sicut infra magis patebit. Unde in parte intellectiva non duae potentiae distinguuntur, sed tantum duo genera actuum, visionis scilicet et conceptionis vel dictionis. Unde et dicit S. Thomas: “ Videmus quod diversa quae in inferiori ordine potentiarum pertinent ad diversas potentias, in superiori ordine pertineut ad unum, sicut sensus communis apprehendit sensata omnium sensuum propriorum. Apprehendere igitur et conservare, quae in parte animae sensitivae pertinent ad diversas potentias, oportet quod in suprema potentia, scilicet intellectu, uniantur, (III C. G. c. 74).

3. De distinctione verbi ab intelligere et de Verbo Dei.

Ex hactenus dictis iam triplicem conclusionem colligere licebit. quam in thesi indicavimus, i. e verbum cordis in nobis realiter differre ab intelligere a quo exprimitur; et hoc non esse potentialitatis adiunctae, sed ad ipsam formalem dictionis rationem pertinere; atque proinde Verbum in Deo poni non posse, quin ponatur Persona distincta.

1º Secundum disertam Angelici doctrinam, intentio intellecta sive verbum cordis realiter differt et ab intellectu, et a specie impressa, et ab ipsa actuali notitia mentis, atque demum ab obiecto intellecto. Sed quia iam audivimus, quomodo duo media in intelligendo ab invicem diligenter distinguat (De Potentia, Q. 9, art. 5, supra p. +2): videamus iam, quod non minus accuratae ab obiecto intellecto atque ab ipso potissimum intelligere (quod nostri in praesenti interest) verbum mentis discernit:

Intelligens in intelligendo ad quattuor potest habere ordi nem, scilicet ad rem quae intelligitur, ad speciem intelligibilem qua fit intellectus in actu, ad suum intelligere et ad conceptionem intellectus. Quae quidem conceptio a tribus praedictis differt: a re quidem intellecta, quia res intellecta est interdum extra intellectum, conceptio autem intellectus non est nisi in intellectu; et iterum conceptio intellectus ordinatur ad rem intellectam sicut ad finem: propter hoc enim intellectus conceptionem rei in se format, ut rem intellectam cognoscat. Differt autem a specie intelligibili, nam species intelligibilis qua fit intellectus in actu consideratur ut principium actionis intellectus, cum omne agens agat secundum quod est actu: actu autem fit per aliquam formam, quam oportet esse actionis principium. Differt autem ab actione intellectus, quia praedicta conceptio consideratur UT TERMINUS ACTIONIS ET QUASI QUODDAM PER IPSAM CONSTITUTUM, Intellectus enim sua actione format rei definitionem vel etiam propositionem affirmativam seu negativam, (De Potentia, Q. 8, art. 1).

Verbum igitur non est intelligere, sed quoddam expressum per intelligere ab eoque formatum est speculum vivum in quo obiectum intelligibiliter resplendet et praebet se aspectui intelligentis; est species quaedam, non operatio, est expressum non exprimens. Realiter ergo differunt notitia et verbum.

2º Simul inde colligitur, non imperfectionis seu limitationis vel potentialitatis esse talem distinctionem; non eam convenire verbo quia est quid creatum, sed quia est verbum. Est enim de ipsa formali ratione verbi, quod sit quid prolatum ab intelligere, sicut sermo est ab ore prolatus. Non tamen invenitur neque est possibile neque intelligibile, quod aliquid sit principium sui, quod sit simul causa et causatum, producens et procedens, oporteret enim quod esset (saltem natura) prius seipso, quod est absurdum.

Unde longe aliter hanc distinctionem consideremus, quam illas quae inter intelligentem et virtutem intellectivam, vel inter virtutem et formam intelligibilem, vel inter virtutem et actualem notitiam, vel demum inter intelligentem et obiectum intellectum intercedunt. Intelligens enim a sua virtute, et virtus a sua actione secundum rem differunt sicut potentia et actus seu sicut perfectibile et perfectio, quod est limitationis et potentialitatis. Talis distinctio tendit ad unitatem et modulo suo unitatem imitatur, fieret unum si posset: Omnis enim compositio est unio. (De Potentia, Q. 7, art. 1 ad 10) et: Compositio est quaedam imitatio unitatis, unde et unio dici tur, (De Veritate, Q. 2, art. 7, ad 3). Talem unionem si in Deum transferas, omnem distinctionem evanescentem videbis et in omnimodam unitatem se vertentem.

Idem dicendum de distinctione inter intellectum et formam intelligibilem seu speciem impressam: nam actuando et determinando species foecundat potentiam. Imo non aliter potest esse de distinctione reali inter intelligentem et obiectum intellectum. Non enim est de ratione formali obiecti, ut sit aliud a subiecto intelligente. Intelligens namque in intelligendo fit unum cum obiecto, fit ipsum intellectum, illo modo essendi secundum repraesentationem, quem infra paulo fusius expo nemus. Unde tantum abest, ut distinctio realis inter intelligentem et intellectum requiratur, ut eorum identitas sit summa intellectionis perfectio. Unde et S. Thomas demonstrat quod Deus, cum maxime sibiipsi sit unum, maxime seipsum intelligit. (I C. G. 47). Et omnia quae diximus recapitulans dicit: Et sic patet ex omnibus praemissis, quod in Deo intellectus, intelligens, et id quod intelligitur, et species intelligibilis, et ipsum intelligere sunt omnino unum et idem, (I" Q. 14, art. 4).

Longe aliter distinctionem verbi ab intelligere consideremus: haec enim duo extrema in nobis non uniuntur sed opponuntur. Omnis namque causa suam sibi operationem unit, qua actuatur et causans constituitur: effectum vero vel OPERATUM extra se ponit. Operans qua talis, ab operatione qua tali completur, operatum vero qua tale secum non compatitur. Et hoc quia necessario et de sua ratione formali distinguuntur et relative opponuntur causare et causari, activum et passivum.

3º Cum ergo verbum cordis in nobis de sua formali ratione habeat, quod ab altero procedat, sine distinctione reali a dicente ne intelligi quidem poterit. Unde si Verbum in Deo ponis, quod absque Revelatione non potes, eo ipso Verbum realiter progrediens posuisti, et cum omne quod est in Deo sit Deus et totus Deus, ponendo Verbum, posuisti quid subsistens in divina Natura, posuisti Personam divinam ab alia Persona divina, quae Verbum dicit, realiter distinctam: posuisti Filium nascentem a Patre. Quae omnia in diserta doctrina Angelici Doctoris habentur:

• Oportet quod nomen Verbi secundum quod proprie in di vinis accipitur, non sumatur essentialiter sed tantum personali ter, (I Q. 34, art. 1).

Nihil eorum quae ad intellectum pertinent personaliter dicitur in divinis, nisi solum verbum. Solum enim verbum significat aliquid ab alio emanans», (Ib., ad 2).

Anselmus improprie accepit dicere pro intelligere, quae tamen differunt. Nam intelligere importat solum habitudinem intelligentis ad rem intellectam, in qua nulla ratio originis importatur, sed solum informatio quaedam in intellectu nostro, prout intellectus noster fit in actu per formam rei intellectae. In Deo autem importat omnimodam identitatem, quia in Deo est omnino idem intellectus et intellectum. Sed dicere importat principaliter habitudinem ad verbum conceptum, nihil enim est a'iud dicere, quam proferre verbum, (Ib., ad 3. cf. etiam Q. 28, art. 4. ad 1).

• Verbum intellectus in nobis DUO HABET DE SUA RATIONE: SCILICET QUOD EST INTELLECTUM ET QUOD EST AB ALIO EXPRESSUM. Si ergo secundum utriusque similitudinem verbum dicatur in divinis, tunc non solum importabitur per Verbum divinum processus rationis sed etiam rei. Si autem secundum similitudinem alterius tantum, scilicet quod est intellectum, sic hoc nomen Verbum in divinis non importabit processionem realem sed rationis tantum, sicut et hoc nomen intellectum. Sed hoc non erit secundum propriam verbi acceptionem, quia si aliquid eorum quae sunt de ratione alicuius auferatur, iam non est propria acceptio. UNDE SI VERBUM PROPRIE ACCIPIATUR IN DIVINIS NON DICITUR NISI PERSONALITER, (De Veritate, Q. 4, art. 2, ubi videatur ex integro corpus articuli).

Dupliciter potest aliquid procedere ab altero: uno modo sicut actio ab agente vel operatio ab operante, alio modo SICUT ORERATUM AB OPERANTE. Processus ergo operationis ab operante non distinguit rem per se existentem ab alia re per se existente, sed distinguit perfectionem a perfecto, quia operatio est perfectio operantis. Sed processus operati distinguit unam rem ab alia. In divinis autem non potest esse secundum rem distinctio perfectionis a perfectibili. Inveniuntur tamen in Deo res ab invicem distinctae, scilicet tres Personae; et ideo processus qui signifi catur in divinis ut operationis ab operante non est nisi rationis tantum, sed processus qui significatur ut rei a principio potest in Deo realiter inveniri, (Ibid., ad 7, cf. etiam ad 1, ad 2, ad 4, ad 6, ad 8).

Verbum in divinis NON POTEST DICI NISI PERSONALITER, SI proprie accipiatur. (De Potentia, Q. 9, art. 9. ad 7).

• Istud Verbum Dei... (est) quoddam completum subsistens in natura divina, habens rationem ab altero procedentis: SINE HOC ENIM VERBUM INTELLIGI NON POTEST, (De rationibus fidei, c. 3).

• Verbum proprie loquendo SEMPER PERSONALITER ACCIPITUR IN DIVINIS, cum non importet nisi quid expressum ab intelligente, (In loannem, cap. 1, Vivès t. XIX, p. 678).

Patet igitur ex praedictis, quod nomen verbi distinctionem personalem ponit in divinis: sed dicit etiam unitatem essentiae; de quo nunc disserendum est.

III. De nomine Verbi quatenus unitatem essentiae dicit.

Thesis. Cum verbum in Intellectu nostro conceptum de sua formali ratione habeat, quod coessentiale maneat actuall notitiae a qua procedit: fundamentum praebet ad consubstantialitatem divini verbi analogice concipiendam.

Coessentialitatem nostri verbi prius ex auctoritate S. Thomae, deinde ex ratione demonstrare intendimus, ut deinde rem ad theologica transferamus.

 

 

1. Coessentialitas verbi ex S. Thoma probatur.

Doctrina philosophica S. Thomae de coessentialitate verbi cordis in quodam argumento theologico invenitur, quo consubstantialitatem Verbi Dei cum Patre manifestare solet. Unde praesciendum, quod tripliciter eadem consubstantialitas a S. Thoma probatur:

Primo quidem ex simplicitate Dei. Omne enim, uti iam diximus, quod inest Deo, est Deus et totus Deus. Unde omnis distinctio realis in Deo est necessario distinctio personalis. Hoc argumentum invenies, plus minusve distincte:

I Q. 27, art., 3, ad 2, et Q. 28, art. 2 ad 1.

III Q. 3, art. 3, ad 1.

IV C. G., c. 7 § Amplius, quidquid.

c. 12 in medio.

c. 14 § Ex hoc autem patet.

§ Ex hoc etiam patet.

De Potentia Q. 9, art. 9, ad 6, ad in contrarium.

Secundum argumentum procedit ex ratione verbi, in quantum obiectum repraesentat eiusque vices gerit. Intelligens enim in intelligendo ita tendit ad sibi uniendum intelligibiliter obiectum intellectum, ut substantialiter fieret ipsum, si possi bile esset. Sed nullius creaturae esse naturale simul etiam est esse intelligibile[4], in Deo autem est, quia Deus solus est suum intelligere. Homo ergo seipsum intelligens non fit homo intellectus substantialiter sed accidentaliter: Deus vero seipsum intelligens est Deus intellectus substantialiter. Ita fere argumentum legitur:

1 Q. 27, art. 1, ad 2.

art. 2, c. § Procedit enim per modum.

IV C. G. C. 11 § Non autem sic est: Ipsum vero Verbum Dei ex hoc ipso quod est Deus intellectus, est verus Deus habens naturaliter esse divinum, eo quod non est aliud naturale esse Dei et aliud eius intelligere..

Ib. c. 14 § Et quia Fili, Dei generatio

c. 26 § Huiusmodi autem

Compendium Theologiae, c. 50.

Saepissime etiam hoc secundum argumentum legitur apud Ioannem a S. Thoma (v. g. supra p. 3), cui hic apex videtur totius theologiae S. Thomae de Verbo Dei. Et tamen, si ita sumatur nomen Verbi, imperfectius numericam essentiae unitatem dicit: non ex ipsa scilicet verbi ratione sed ex infinitate verbi seu modo divino eius. Unde longe pulchrius est: Tertium argumentum, quod procedit ex ratione formali verbi, in quantum non ad obiectum refertur (= conceptus obiectivus) sed ad subiectum (conceptus formalis). En vero istud argumentum, sicut in forma redigi posse videtur:

Nomen Verbi in Deo proprie dicitur, ita ut ratio signifi cata per hanc vocem verbum interius conceptum vere et formaliter in Deo salvetur, quamvis iuxta modum eminentiorem, qui modus a nobis per viam negationis et remotionis attingitur.

Atqui VERBUM NOSTRUM DE SUA RATIONE HABET, QUOD IN PROCEDENDO AB ACTUALI NOTITIA MENTIS, IPSI COESSENTIALE MANEAT NEQUE HABEAT ALIUD ESSE NISI IPSUM ISTUD INTELLIGERE A QUO PROCEDERE NON DESINIT, SED INTELLIGERE PASSIVE SUMPTUM, UT ITA VERBUM SIT SUUM NASCI, NON ALIA QUALITAS NATA.

Ergo Verbum Dei est notitiae Dei seu eius intelligere coessentiale.

Iam vero in Deo idem est esse et intelligere.

Ergo Verbum Dei, cum sit coessentiale illi notitiae substantiali qui est ipse Deus, ita ab eo procedit, ut maneat ei in unitate numerica eiusdem substantiae vere consubstantiale.

Et cum ulterius verbum nostrum, notitiae coessentiale sit etiam illi notitiae perfecte simile, idque vi originis intelli gibilis, non solum ratione coessentialitatis, (nam verbum pro. cedit, ut manifestet notitiam et haec splendescat, verbum est lux et splendor et imago notitiae): ideo vivens Verbum Dei, consubstantiale viventi Deo dicenti, procedit in similitudinem naturae, i. e. nascitur proprie tamquam Filius a Patre, ut ita in nomine Verbi eadem proprietas importetur quae in nomine Filii.

De ista Filiatione qua tali hic non videtur dicendi locus, sed ostendendum est, S. Thomam consubstantialitatem Verbi Dei ex coessentialitate nostri verbi demonstrare. Ad quod tres testimoniorum series adducemus, explicita scilicet, et quasi-explicita, et implicita.

Prima series: testimonia explicita.

• Huiusmodi autem verbum nostri intellectus est quidem extrinsecum ab esse ipsius intellectus, non enim est de essentia sed est quasi passio[5] ipsius, NON TAMEN EST EXTRINSECUM AB IPSO INTELLIGERE intellectus, cum ipsum intelligere compleri non possit sine verbo praedicto. Si ergo aliquis intellectus sit cuius intelligere est suum esse, oportebit quod illud Verbum non sit extrinsecum ab esse ipsius intellectus sicut nec ab intelligere. Oportet ergo quod eius Verbum non sit extra essentiam eius sed ei coessentiale. Sic ergo in Deo potest inveniri origo alicuius ex aliquo, scilicet Verbi et proferentis Verbum, unitate essentiae servata. (De Potentia, Q. 8, art. 1).

In intellectu nostro aliud est intelligere et aliud esse: et ideo verbum conceptum in intellectu nostro, cum procedat ab intellectu in quantum est intellectus, non unitur ei in natura SED SOLUM IN INTELLIGERE. Intelligere autem Dei est esse eius: unde Verbum quod procedit a Deo in quantum est intelligens, procedit ab eo in quantum est existens; et propter hoc Verbum conceptum habet eamdem essentiam et naturam quam intellectus concipiens. Et quia quod recipit naturam in rebus viventibus dicitur genitum et filius, Verbum divinum dicitur genitus et Filius, (De Potentia, Q. 9, art. 5).

Quum autem intellectus divinus non solum sit semper in actu, sed sit etiam ipse actus purus, oportet quod substantia intellectus divini sit ipsum suum intelligere, quod est actus intellectus. ESSE AUTEM VERBI INTERIUS CONCEPTI SIVE INTENTIONIS INTELLECTAE EST IPSUM SUUM INTELLIGI. Idem ergo esse est Verbi divini et intellectus divini, et per consequens ipsius Dei, qui est suus intellectus. Esse autem Dei est eius essentia vel natura. Verbum igitur Dei est ipsum Esse divinum et Essentia eius, et ipse verus Deus, (IV C. G., c. 11, § Manifestum est enim).

Observandum est, S. Thomam in hoc capite 11 quarti libri contra Gentiles iterato docere, quod esse intentionis intellectae, i. e. verbi cordis, est ipsum suum intelligi. Paulo enim inferius habetur: Quum intentionis intellectae esse sit ipsum suum intelligi. Et paulo superius textus authenthicus ita legit: Quod autem intentio intellecta non sit ipse intellectus in nobis, ex eo patet, quod esse intentionis intellectae in ipso intelligi consistit, non autem esse intellectus nostri, cuius esse non est suum intelligere. (ed. leonina; textus receptus habet: in ipso intellectu consistit.).

Ut autem verus sensus istius dictionis appareat, scilicet verbum esse suum intelligi, observandum, non obiectum tantum in verbo intelligi, sed ipsum etiam verbum intelligi, i. e. exprimi. Sicut enim si quis patrem suum lugeret mortuum, et patrem posset dici plorare, et plorare lacrymas, i. e. eas profundere, ita et qui intelligit, simul obiectum intelligit, i. e. apprehendit, et verbum intelligit, i. e. profundit, nam inteligendo exprimimus verbum, sicut infra magis patebit. Trita sunt huiusmodi in omnibus linguis, quamvis frequentius in Scriptura Sacra occurrere videantur; ibi enim legimus v. g. • Cogito super vos cogitationes (Ier. XXIX, 11), In praecepto quod mandasti (Ps. VII), ἔχάρησαν χαρὰν μεγάλην (Matt. II, 10) et multa similia.

Verbum igitur intelligitur iuxta D. Thomam, i. e. exprimitur, producitur ab ipso actuali intelligere. Sed esse verbi ita concepti nihil est aliud nisi suum intelligi, i. e. ipsum suum produci, ipsum suum nasci. Si ita legitur istud ultimum testimonium, argumentum omnino idem cum praecedentibus praebet, quae aliam expositionem non habent, et omnia plane procedent:

Esse divini Intellectus est suum intelligere.

Esse autem omnis verbi est suum intelligi.

Idem ergo esse est Verbi divini et intellectus divini, quamvis active habeatur ab intellectu ( intelligere), passive a Verbo ( intelligi). Quod quomodo sit, mox indicabitur: nunc autem alia testimonia legamus.

Secunda series: testimonia quasi-explicita.

• Considerandum est autem, quod cum in nobis sit aliud esse naturale et intelligere, oportet quod verbum in nostro intellectu conceptum, QUOD HABET ESSE INTELLIGIBILE TANTUM, alte rius naturae sit quam intellectus noster, qui habet esse naturale. In Deo autem idem est esse et intelligere. Verbum igitur Dei, quod est in Deo, cuius Verbum est secundum esse intelligibile, idem esse habet cum Deo, cuius est Verbum. Et per hoc oportet quod sit eiusdem essentiae et naturae cum ipso, et quod omnia quaecumque de Deo dicuntur, Verbo Dei conveniant. Et inde est, quod in regula catholicae fidei docemur confiteri Filium consubstantialem Patri, (Compendium Theologiae cc. 41-42).

Tertia differentia est, quod verbum nostrum non est eiusdem naturae nobiscum, sed Verbum divinum est eiusdem naturae cum Deo, et ideo est aliquid subsistens in natura divina. Nam ratio intellecta, quam intellectus noster de aliqua re format, HABET ESSE IN ANIMA INTELLIGIBILE TANTUM; intelligere autem animae non est idem quod esse naturale animae, quia anima non est sua operatio; et ideo verbum quod format intellectus noster non est de essentia animae sed est accidens ei. In Deo autem idem est intelligere et esse, et ideo Verbum intellectus divini non est aliquid accidens sed pertinens ad naturam eius, (In Ioannem c. I. t. XIX p. 678).

In nobis non est idem esse et intelligere: unde ILLUD QUOD HABET IN NOBIS ESSE INTELLIGIBILE non pertinet ad naturam nostram. Sed esse Dei est ipsum eius intelligere. Unde Verbum Dei non est aliquod accidens in Ipso vel aliquis effectus eius, sed pertinet ad ipsam naturam eius. (I Q. 34 art. 2 ad 1).

Statim inspicienti testimonia huius seriei patet, eumdem omnino argumentandi processum hic haberi, coessentialitatem autem verbi significari his verbis: Verbum habet esse intelligibile tantum. Alioquin, quomodo haec sibi cohaerebunt: Verbum habet esse intelligibile tantum; intelligere autem nostrum non est nostra substantia; ergo et verbum a substantia differt? (cf. p. 28).

Non tamen statim apparet, quare ista tam mira locutione S. Thomas coessentialitatem verbi significet. Ut ergo sensus horum testimoniorum manifestetur, recolendum est quod modo dicebamus super locum e IV C. G. cap. 11. Sicut enim ipsum intelligi verbi non est ipsum intelligi obiecti in verbo, sed ipsum exprimi verbi: ita et hic esse naturale opponitur esse intelligibili non obiecti sed subiecti. Et revera non semel apud S. Thomam esse intelligibile ad obiectum primo refertur, ut v. g. I Q. 56 art. 2 ad 3; sed saepissime etiam primo refertur ad ipsum subiectum, quod per suum intelligere quodammodo fit omnia. Intelligere est illa quasi superaddita exsistentia, qua cognoscens coarctationem sui esse naturalis evadit et obiective vel intentionaliter fit alia a se (I Q. 14, art. 1). Unde saepe etiam parallelismum apud Angelicum Doctorem invenies inter lineam naturalis exsistentiae, cuius radix est essentia, materia scilicet, forma substantiali formata; et lineam intelligibilis esse, quod intra intellectum continetur et actuat ipsum intellectum (quasi materiam), specie intelligibili (quasi forma) determinatum. Unde etiam dicit S. Thomas: Ipsum quod intellectu comprehenditur (verbum scilicet), intra intellectum existens conforme est et intelligibili moventi, cuius quaedam similitudo est, et intellectui quasi patienti, SECUNDUM QUOD ESSE INTELLIGIBILE HABET, (Compendium, c. 38). Verbum ergo habet esse intelligibile non quatenus ad obiectum vel ad speciem, sed quatenus ad subiectum vel intellectum refertur.

In parallelismo autem praedicto inter lineam naturalem et lineam intelligibilem (de quo ct. 1 Q. 14, art. 2 ad 3, art. 4 c., Q. 34, art. 1 ad 2, De Veritate Q. 2, art. 2, I C. G. 45. II Sent. 15, Q. 3, art. 1 ad 5), quaedam inveniuntur, quae ad utramque lineam pertinent. Intellectus enim est proprietas naturalis in ordine naturae, et est quasi-materia in ordine intelligibili. Intelligere vero actuale ad lineam naturae nullatenus pertinet, cum sit praedicatum accidentale (accidens praedicabile), cum tamen in linea intelligibili sit summa actualitas et quasi-exsistentia lineam complens. Cum ergo dicit S. Thomas, quod verbum habet esse intelligibile tantum, sensus est, quod non aliud esse habet nisi ipsum intelligere, quamvis passive sumptum.

Tertia series: testimonia implicita.

Hac serie testimonia complectimur, quae idem argumentum referunt, sed coessentialitatem verbi tacite supponunt:

• Quod autem in sola natura divina pluribus modis natura communicatur, rationabile est, quia in solo Deo eius operatio est suum esse. Unde quum in eo, sicut in qualibet intellectuali natura, sit intelligere et velle, id quod procedit in eo per modum intellectus, ut verbum, aut amoris et voluntatis, ut amor, oportet quod habeat esse divinum et sit Deus, et sic tam Filius quam Spiritus Sanctus est verus Deus, (IV C. G. c. 23).

• Verbum autem et amor in creatura quidem non sunt personae subsistentes in natura intelligente et volente: intelligere enim et velle creaturae non est eius esse. Unde verbum et amor sunt quaedam supervenientia creaturae intelligenti et volenti, sicut accidentia quaedam. Cum autem in Deo idem sit esse, intelligere et velle, necessarium est, quod Verbum et Amor in Deo non accidant sed subsistant in natura divina, (De Potentia Q. 8 art. 9).

• In intellectualibus substantiis quae sunt nobilissimae creaturae, est etiam processio secundum operationem intellectus et voluntatis, et quantum ad hoc invenitur in eis increatae Trinitatis imago. Sed verbum et amor in eis non sunt personae subsistentes; earum enim intelligere et velle non est ipsarum substantia, sed hoc proprium Dei est. Unde Verbum et Amor procedunt in Deo ut Personae subsisientes, (De Potentia, Q. 10, art. 1 ad 5).

Valde admirandum argumentum: intelligere est substantia, in Deo videlicet, ergo Verbum divinum est divina Substantia. Intelligere non est substantia, i. e. in nobis: ergo nec verbum est nostra substantia. Quomodo haec vera esse pos sunt, nisi supponatur, verbum et intelligere ex sua ratione esse unum? Sic qui argumentatur: A est C, cum B sit C, necessario supponere videtur, quod A est B. Quod ergo in praecedentibus testimoniis evidentius dixerat, hic S. Thomas satis ducit apertum, ut silere possit, verbum semper coessentiale esse notitiae a qua procedit. Et simul in his locis iam coessentialitas amoris apparet, de qua postea dicendum erit.

2. Coessentialitas verbi ex ratione probatur et aliis S. Thomae auctoritatibus fulcitur.

Quod verbum in nobis coessentiale manet notitiae a qua procedit, ex ipsa ratione dictionis manifestari potest. Dicere enim est producere verbum. Sed cavendum omnino ne talis productio univoce concipiatur et productionibus rerum corporalium aequiparetur: quasi notitia ita qualitatem a se distinctam, scilicet verbum, produceret, sicut v. g. artifex fabricat speculum, i. e. per causalitatem efficientem et eductionem formae e materia. Tunc aut intellectus duas haberet operationes distinctas, scilicet producere et contemplare, quod dicitur sententia Scoti, aut ipse unus notitiae actus duo haberet officia, productionis et contemplationis, officiumque actio nis praedicamentalis virtualiter-eminenter suo proprio iunge ret muneri, ut dicunt nonnulli thomistae:

• Quod ipsa intellectio sit VIRTUALITER actio productiva constat, quia dictio est ipsamet intellectio ut expressiva; sed dictio est actio productiva verbi; ergo intellectio ut expressiva est productiva, et CUM SIT DE GENERE QUALITATIS, UT OSTENSUM EST. SOLUM VIRTUALITER ERIT ACTIO PRODUCTIVA. (Joannes a S. Thoma Cursus Phil., Phil. Nat. IV Pars, Q. XI art. 1, 3 concl.). Intellectio, licet in quantum gerit officium causalitatis respectu conceptus producti inferior ipso videatur, sed tamen simpliciter est perfectior, quia non sistit in hoc sed etiam manet et per ficit operantem post effectum productum. (Ib. in sol. 2' argumenti).

• Cognitio autem ipsa est causalitas (per accidens) productiva speciei expressae. Dicimus per accidens, quia per se non est causalitas sed qualitas (actio metaphysica). (Gredt Elem. Phil. n. 476,2 cum nota).

Productionem, ut diximus, univoce concipiunt, causalitatem efficientem et exitum de potentia in actum cogitant, etsi qualitati eam tribuant; sed tunc necessario sequitur, quod sint duae qualitates verbum et intellectio (Ioann. a S. Th. 1. c. initio art.), nam quaenam causalitas effectum producit, quae est ipsamet causalitas?

Credimus autem productionem omnino analogice esse cogitandam. Actio enim producit, sed suo humili modo; intellectio etiam producit, sed longe aliter et suo proprio spirituali modo. In ipsa natura talis actionis metaphysicae quaerenda videtur ista omnino sui generis productio, quae non est exitus de potentia in actum (IV C. G, c. 14). sicut ipse monet S. Thomas: SECUNDUM DIVERSITATEM NATURARUM EST IN DIVERSIS REBUS DIVERSUS MODUS ALIQUID EX ALIO PROCEDENDI (Compendium c. 52) Sicut secundum actionem quae tendit in exteriorem materiam est aliqua processio AD EXTRA, ila secundum actionem quae manet in ipso agente attenditur processio quaedam AD INTRA, et hoc maxime patet in intellectu. (I Q. 27 art. 1).

Ostensum est quidem supra, non omnem intellectionem producere verbum: unde dictio est intellectio modificata. Ex alia vero parte nunc admonemur, ut in ipsa formali ratione intelligendi quaeramus rationem productionis atque dicamus, intellectionem non inferius munus, scilicet causalitatis efficientis, sibi assumere, licet virtualiter et eminenter, sed intellectionem per se (quarto modo dicendi per se) et formaliter esse productivam verbi, sicut etiam expresse dicit S. Thomas: • Quicumque intelligit, EX HOC IPSO QUOD INTELLIGIT, procedit aliquid intra eum, quod est conceptio rei intellectae, ex vi intellectiva proveniens et ex eius notilia procedens. (I Q. 27 art. 1). Quomodo autem haec sibi cohaerebunt, dictionem esse intellectionem modificatam, et tamen ex ipsa formali ratione intelligendi verbum procedere?

Respondendum censemus, dictionem esse quidem intellectionem modificatam, non vero extraneo modo vel formalitate, ut inde quasi quasdam sordes contrahat, (nam quaelibet res ex immixtione peioris sordescit, ut argentum ex immixtione plumbi II II Q. 81 art. 8): sed intellectionem, cum fit dictio, ipsa sua intellectualitate augeri et duplicari. Nam tantum abest ut modus ille dictionis puritatem intellectionis alteret, ut e contra eam in summum tollat atque in quemdam foecunditatis simul et puritatis verticem evehat. Dum enim intellectio simplex seu visio cognoscit tantum, intellectio foecunda seu conceptio vel dictio COGNITUM REDDIT, suamque sibi notitiam MANIFESTAT. Quid est autem manifestare, nisi PRODUCERE MANIFESTATIONEM?[6]. Manifestare est vividam obiecti imaginem ex intimis visceribus generare et ita verbum mentale producere. Istud autem verbum, a notitia modo praedicto GENITUM, NON FACTUM, est signum formale, i. e. mera obiecti similitudo et nullis extraneis involucris contecta purissima actualis notitia, quamvis genita et interius pronuntiata[7].

Aliis verbis: dictio est spiritualis proiectio obiecti ante oculos cordis, est manifestatio quidem activa, scilicet ipsum intelligere, at simul importat et ipsa definitione sua implicat aeque actualem, aeque vividam manifestationem passivam, scilicet ipsum intelligi, seu verbum cordis, nam Ipsum intel ligere compleri non potest sine verbo praedicto. (De Po tentia Q. 8 art. 1, supra p. 15). Quae duo, manifestare et manifestari, intelligere et verbum, in eodem intelligere foecundo simul opponuntur et identificantur, idque multo magis quam actio et passio, quae eiusdem unitatis exemplum quoddam corporeum constituunt. Dicit namque S. Thomas: Li cet actio sit idem motui, similiter et passio: non tamen sequitur quod actio et passio sint idem; quia in actione importatur re spectus ut A QUO est motus in mobili; in passione vero ut QUI est ab alio. Et similiter, licet Paternitas sit idem secundum rem cum Essentia divina et similiter Filiatio: tamen haec duo in suis propriis rationibus important oppositos respectus; unde distinguuntur ab invicem, (I Q. 28 art. 3 ad 1).

Aliud exemplum corporeum, nec ineptum, in invento illo nostri temporis considerari potest, quo, ope luminosae proiectionis, ut aiunt, sive cinematographice, sive solummodo graphice, imagines in tela candida repercutiuntur. Idem enim numero lumen et manifestat et manifestatur, est simul actio proiiciens et imago proiecta, active et praegnanter in lentilla fervet, passive in tela splendet; et tamen ex oppositione ista relativa necessario realiter distinguuntur. Eodem exemplo et cetera omnia, quae in intellectione humana concurrunt, de quibus supra diximus, non incongrue figurari possunt, sicut patet ex schemate quod subicimus, quod sibi loquetur[8].

 

  Lumen intellectus The light of the intellect.

  Species impressa The impressed species.

  Lumen intelligere tamquam focus intellectualis luminis The light of understanding, as the focal point of intellectual light.

  Species expressa The expressed species.

  Objectum intellectum The understood object.

Exemplum tamen huiusmodi luminis materialis ad id tantum ponitur, ut intellectui sensibilibus immerso quasi quidam gradus sit, ad propriunı suum actum spiritualem concipiendum, non autem ad res divinas his metaphoris explicandas: Nam ipsa divina natura spiritualis est, unde per exempla spiritualia melius manifestatur, (De Potentia, Q. 2, art. 1). Et monet S. Augustinus: Quidquid tibi cum ista (scilicet Trinitatem) cogitas, corporeae similitudinis occurrerit, abige, abnue, nega, respue, abiice, fuge..., intellectum vero valde ama», (Ер. 120, 3).

COROLLARIUM 1. De verbo tamquam specie.

Verbum igitur cordis si species dicitur, multum id aliter intelligatur quam de specie impressa. Haec est habitualis qualitas, illud est ipsum suum actualiter manifestari atque e notitiae fornacula proiici. Verbum est ipse ille actus a quo progreditur, passive spectatus, est demum ipsum suum intel ligi suumque nasci. Unde raro et quasi cunctando illam intentionem intellectam S. Thomas speciem vocat: Quamvis ipsum verbum POSSIT DICI forma vel species intelligibilis, sicut per intellectum constituta, prout forma artis qnam intellectus adinvenit, dicitur QUAEDAM SPECIES, (Quodl. V, art. 9). Sed verbum dicit • sapientiam genitam, notitiam genilam», « notitiam expressam, • cogitationem formatam, • ipsum interius intellectum etc. (cf. I, Q. 34, art. 1, ad 2, De Veritate Q. 4, art. 1, 4 Sed Contra et corp. art., ib. art. 2, ad 2 etc.). Numquam denique verbum dicit habitum, (quod faciunt nonnulli thomistae, ut v. g. Maritain, Degrés du Savoir, p. 242 note): sed illud dicit ACTUM EX ACTU. Ita habes in IV C. G. cap. 14, ubi dicit quod generatio divina non est secundum exitum de potentia in actum, SED SICUT ORITUR EX ACTU ACTUS, UT SPLENDOR EX LUCE ET RATIO INTELLECTA EX INTELLECTU IN ACTU.

COROLLARIUM 2. De continuo fieri verbi.

Non ergo formatio verbi praecedit contemplationem in eo, sed ipsa formatio est contemplatio, et contemplatio est formatio: et ita intellectio et verbum semper sunt simul sicut lux et radius Cumque cessat actualis dictio, tunc verbum simul esse et formari desinit. Unde omnino reliquendum videtur, quod nonnulli dicunt, verbum prius formari et tunc perfectam contemplationem sine formatione verbi incipere: • Intellectio non cessat per acquisitionem alicuius formae, quia etiam producto conceptu seu verbo, quod est eius terminus remanet intellectio contemplans in illo. Imo tunc est perfectior intellectio, quando iam perfecte formatum est verbum, (Ioannes a S. Thoma, Phil. Nat., IV, P. Q. 11 art. 1, 2ª concl.).

• Dictio est ipsa cognitio considerata in fieri, verbo autem formato seu specie expressa, redditur perfecta et completa cognitio tamquam contemplatio, (Gredt n. 476,2).

Longe aliter S. Thomas:

• Necesse est in corporalibus, quod id quod concipitur nondum sit et id quod parturitur in parturiendo non sit a partu riente distinctum. Conceptio autem el partus intelligibilis verbi non est cum motu nec cum successione; unde simul dum concipitur, est, et simul dum parturitur, distinctum est, (IV C. G., c. 11).

• In his quae fiunt sine motu, SIMUL EST FIERI ET FACTUM ESSE, sive talis factio sit terminus motus, sicut illuminatio, nam simul aliquid illuminatur et illuminatum est, sive non sit terminus motus, sicut simul formatur verbum in corde et formatum est. ET IN HIS, QUOD FIT, EST. (1°, Q. 45, art. 2, ad 3).

Bene etiam Caietanus: S. Thomas autem ubique tenet, quod dicere est intelligere exprimendo et exprimere intelligendo, ita ut utrumque horum est de eius ratione... Actus intelligendi et conceptus simul sunt et non sunt, (In I, Q. 27, art. 1, n. 13, cf. Salmanticenses ib., disp. 1, dub. 3).

Praedicti autem auctores qui aliter sentiunt, permiscere videntur ipsam processionem verbi (quod ad formalem rationem dictionis pertinet), et successivam formationem verbi HUMANI: nam intelligere nostrum plerumque per discursum ad contemplationem pervenit, et cum ita intelligere procedit de potentia in actum, verbum ipsi coessentiale non potest non et ipsum de potentia in actum exire, i. e. sensim paulatimque perfici. Unde dicit S. Thomas: Verbum quod in mente nostra concipitur, non exit de polentia in actum, NISI QUATENUS INTELLECTUS NOSTER PROCEDIT DE POTENTIA IN ACTUM; nec tamen verbum oritur ex intellectu nostro nisi prout existit in actu; simul autem quum in actu existit, est in eo verbum conceptum», (IV, C. G., c. 14). ET ALIRI DICIT: Verbum nostrum prius est formabile quam formatum: nam cum volo concipere rationem lapidis, oportet quod ad ipsam RATIOCINANDO perveniam: et sic est in omnibus aliis quae a nobis intelliguntur: nisi forte in primus principiis, quae cum sint naturaliter nota, absque discursu rationis statim cognoscuntur. Quamdiu ergo sic ratiocinando intellectus discurrit, et iactatur hac atque illac, necdum formatio perfecta est, nisi quando ipsam rationem rei perfecte conceperit, et tunc primo habet rationem verbi... Sic ergo verbum nostrum primo est in potentia quam in actus. (In Ioannem C. 1, t. XIX, 677).

Quod autem postquam verbum ad actum perfectum pervenit, tunc perfecte procedit nec umquam procedere desinit, id omnino egregie ab antiquo quodam thomista ita explicatur:

• Verbum enim nostrum semper est IN CONTINUO FIERI quia perfectum eius esse est in fieri. Sed hoc non est imperfectum, sicut est de aliis quae sunt in fieri, quae etiam semper sunt imperfecta; imo verbum in principio sui est perfectum, quia conceptio perfecte formata est; nihilominus esse eius perfectum SERVATUR EODEM MODO QUO GIGNEBATUR. Non enim transit formatio verbi, verbo formato, sed CUM ACTU INTELLIGITUR CONTINUO FORMATUR VERBUM, QUIA SEMPER EST UT IN FIERI ET UT IN EGREDIENDO AB ALIQUO SCILICET DICENTE, (Opusc. de natura verbi intellectus, inter spuria S. Thomae, ed. Mandonnet, t. V, 371).

3Quid sequatur pro theologia.

Conclusioni iam attendendum, nam scopo attingimus. Etenim si verbum nostrum de sua ratione habet processionem tam immanentem, ut sit coessentiale notitiae: tunc immaterialitatem et immanentiam atque consubstantialitatem divinae Generationis analogice et proinde aliqualiter positive concipere possumus, non solum negative attingere. Audientes quod Pater naturam suam dat Filio eamdem numero, non solum assensum fidei praebere possumus, sed • quamdam percep tionem veritatis acquirere, ad intellectum pertinentem (II II Q. 8, art. 5, ad 3): concipere namque possumus, quid sit, procedere ut intimum, absque diversitate, per modum intelligibilem (I, Q. 27, art. 1, ad 3).

Pater enim intelligit se, imo cum sit verus Deus, est ipsum suum intelligere. Intelligendo vero, (ex fide hoc habemus), dicit Verbum, quod est ipsum suum intelligi, nam ratio verbi istud importat. Dicens ergo Deus et Verbum interius pronuntiatum sunt una foecunda notitia substantialis et una numero natura. Realiter vero distinguuntur, cum relative opponantur: en divinam consubstantialitatem, non iam tam quam perplexa veritas et paradoxon, sed tamquam pulcherrimum mysterium, quod fide tenemus et intellectu conspicimus, cum in creatis aliquale eius exemplum habeatur: In communicatione qua divina natura communicatur, per unum et idem esse est in communicante et in eo cui communicatur, et sic manet eadem secundum numerum in utroque. HUIUS AUTEM COMMUNICATIONIS EXEMPLUM IN OPERATIONE INTELLECTUS CONGRUENTISSIME INVENITUR, (De Potentia, Q. 2, art. 1).

Ipsas divinas Relationes concipere possumus, modo conceptum earum ex relatione praedicamentali eruere desinamus, quamvis id fieri possit, imo etiam debeat ad errorem Gilberti Porretani removendum: tamen ad divinas Relationes concipiendas, in nobismetipsis transcendentales illas et omnino sui generis relationes considerare debemus, quae sunt verbum et dictio a qua procedit verbum, relationes scilicet oppositae et realiter distinctae in una qualitate ipsius foecundi intelligere. Ut ibi divinarum Relationum conceptus sumatur, monet S. Thomas, De Potentia, Q. 8, art. 1. Et nemo non videt, quam profunde haec influere debeant in scholasticam tractationem Sanctissimae Trinitatis.

Distinctio autem mere relativa quam diximus, cum in summa unitate inveniatur, MINIMA debet esse, etsi realis. Et hoc etiam S. Thomas confidenter pronuntiat: tam longe a contradictione et paradoxo abesse divinum ei mysterium vi detur:

• Distinctio divinarum hypostasum EST MINIMA DISTINCTIO REALIS QUAE POSSIT ESSE, (I Sent., d. 26, Q. 2. art. 2, ad 2).

• Distinctio Personarum non debet esse nisi per id quod minime distinguit, scilicet per relationem, (I Q. 40, art. 2, ad 3).

• Divinarum Personarum minima est distinctio, (IV C. G., 14).

• Distinctio secundum relationes est minima, sicut et relatio minimum habet de ente inter omnia genera, (De Pot. 9. 5, ad 2).

Tandem, cum sit de ratione verbi, quod nasci numquam desinat, dum actu intelligitur, coaeternitas divini Verbi aliqualiter etiam concipi potest: • Generatio non prohibet Filium Dei esse aeternum; quin magis necesse est ipsum esse coaeternum Deo cuius est Verbum, quia intellectus in actu numquam est sine verbo. (IV C. G., c. 14). Nonne omnino illud luci spirituali convenire debet, cum ipsum etiam corporale lumen vestigium quoddam retineat coaeternitatis Verbi? • Quis intelligit. semper est natus? Da mihi sempiternum ignem, et do tibi sempiternum splendorem. (S. Aug., serm 118).

(Continuabitur)

 

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[1] ) Le travail présent était terminé en substance dès la fin de l'année 1935, mais ce n'est qu'en 1942, que nous avons fait des démarches pour le faire publier. Ces démarches ne purant aboutir alors en raison des difficultés créées par la guerre. Aussi avons-nous entrepris, au bout de deux an nées d'attente, une publication plus discrète. Le texte de l'article présent a été polycopié dans un nombre restreint d'exemplaires, que nous avons adressés, datés du 7 mars 1944, à différents théologiens que nous connaissions aux Pays-Bas. Nous ne regrettons pas cette modeste publication anticipée, car elle nous permet aujourd'hui de tenir un large compte des avis et des conseils bienveillants, qui nous furent donnés à cette occasion. Une impression très nette toutefois nous resta de cette correspondance: c'est que le principal défaut de notre travail était sa trop grande concision. Aussi avonsnous pensé pouvoir nous dispenser d'un remaniement, et nous nous sommes déterminés à l'accompagner simplement de quelque commentaire en notes au bas de la page. Sauf quelques détails insignifiants nous reproduisons donc ici le texte du cahier polycopié, mais toutes les notes sont ajoutées et propres à la publication dans l'Angelicum. Que nous ayons adopté pour ces notes une langue moderne, c'est une réponse aux désirs exprimés par plusieurs lecteurs. Puisque les notes sont complètement distinctes du texte, qui se suffit à lui-même, il nous sembla qu'il n'y avait pas d'inconvénient sérieux à adopter deux langues différentes, l'une pour l'exposé, l'autre pour le commentaire.

[2] Nous ne nous dissimulons nullement, qu'il s'agit d'une chose délicate. Admettre la coessentialité du verbe, n'est-ce pas chercher dans l'ordre créé, ce qui semble un attribut exclusif de l'Acte subsistent? On conviendra  néamoins que l'objection, énoncée ainsi, sans arguments (et jamais on ne nous a opposé un argument), est une pétition de principe évidente, et tout simplement un préjugé. Toute notre étude est ordonnée a détruire ce préjugé, elle y est une réponse au moins indirecte, car montrer que la coessentialité existe, c'est prouver en même temps qu'elle a le droit d'existence: de esse ad posse valet illatio. Une réponse plus directe est très possible aussi. Nous venons de montrer, qu'on ne trouvera jamais la moindre trace de ce préjugé ni chez S. Augustin, ni chez saint Thomas; et nous verrons même que ce dernier, mis en face de la difficulté qu'on prétend tirer du principe d'identité comparée, pour montrer que la Trinité est impossible, y répond non par un appel à quelque attribut divin, mais tout simplement en citant un cas de coessentialité créée, celle de l'action et de la passion. Nous savons bien que tous les thomistes ne s'accordent pas au sujet de cette doctrine philosophique, mais il sera difficile de nier qu'elle n'ait été professée par S. Thomas (1 Q. 28 art. 3 ad 1 cf. II C. G. § Praeterea licet motus). Les thomistes qui se ratachent les plus étroitement au Maltre affirment sans hésitation ce cas de coessentialité. Ainsi le P. Sertillanges écrit: « Le même devenir en tant qu'il procède d'un agent, s'appelle action; en tant qu'il est subi par un sujet, s'appelle passion, et de l'action et de la passion, deux catégories différentes se forment. C'est qu'en effet, bien qu'il n'y ait qu'une différence de rapport entre l'une et l'autre, et bien qu'elles soient corrélatives, l'action et la passion n'en sont pas moins deux réalités de la nature. Recevoir n'est pas la même chose que donner, bien que le don soit leur lien et à vrai dire leur seule réalité positive. Nous avons dit que la relation a sa place dans l'être; l'action et la passion qui l'incluent à titres divers ne peuvent pas s'en voir ôtées ni s'y confondre, par cela seul qu'elles y joi gnent en commun la réalité actuelle du devenir (Saint Thomas d'Aquin t. I p. 118-119) Lorsque, en 1936, au cours d'une retraite que nous prêcha un membre illustre de l'Ordre des Frères Prêcheurs, nous lui exposions nos idées sur la coessentialité du verbe, il nous répondit spontanément: Alors vous croyez que pour saint Thomas entre la pensée et le concept se vérifie, ce qui existe entre l'action et la passion? Pourquoi ne l'a-t-il pas dit? Nous essayerons de montrer que saint Thomas l'a bien dit et très formellement; pour l'instant il nous suffit de constater, que pour les vrais thomistes il n'est pas contradictoire de parler de coessentialité créée. Il serait facile aussi de montrer, que dans la preuve laborieuse par laquelle on a la coutume d'écarter du mystère la contradiction apparente, il n'y a aucun appel a quelq' attribut divin, aussi longtemps qu'il s'agit simplement d'accorder la Trinité avec l'Unité. Le mystère proprement dit, l'inconcevable, ne commence que lorsqu'on affirme que cette coessentialité en Dieu est substantielle, qu'elle est consubstantialité.

[3] Nous prions le lecteur de ne pas omettre ce paragraphe. Il est vrai que nous allons exposer la doctrine soutenue par l'ensemble des thomistes ou à peu près; mais c'est en abordant le problème que nous devons poser une base pour l'exposé de notre thèse. Le plus souvent il y a beaucoup d'imprécision dans les vues introspectives, qui ont pour but d'analyser le procédé de notre intellection. On trouvera ici des nuances d'expression, qui sont de la toute première importance pour l'intelligence exacte de la coessentialité. On excusera donc les longeurs de ces préliminaires: Principium prolixum esse decel, disait Platon.

[4] Nous suivons la terminologie de saint Thomas, pour qui esse intelligibile est souvent synonyme de esse intellectuale, ainsi que nous l'expliquerons un peu plus loin dans le texte.

[5] Pour saint Thomas le mot de passio désigne souvent un accident passager, disparaissant facilement, et qui se distingue en cela non seulement de la propriété, mais de tout autre habitus. Ainsi la lumière de gloire est, dans les bienheureux, un habitus, c. à. d. un accident bien ancré dans le sujet et qui lui est devenu connaturel. Mais on peut aussi concevoir le même accident à l'état de passion, c. à. d. doué d'une existence passagère, comme elle serait dans le voyageur élèvé dans une exstase à la vision de l' Essence divine De Veritate Q. 20 art. 2. Pareillement l'intellection humaine est une passion: elle vient et elle va preuve évidente qu'elle n'est ni l'intelligence ni même une propriété de l'intelligence.

[6] Producere manifestationem signifie: producere aliquod manifestativum. Nous choisissons le terme équivoque, parce qu'il suggère la coessentialité.

[7] Ici se termine notre preuve principale; la suite n'est qu'exemples et confirmations, Nous savons que certains lecteurs ont cherché en vain une preuve dans la page qu'on vient de lire. C'est qu' ils exigent une preuve déductive, alors que l'induction et l'introspection seules peuvent nous livrer la nature de l'intellection. La pensée et le verbe sont un, parce que l'expression de la species expressa n'est pas une production au sens propre mais une projection: chose qui se constate. Si on ne le voit pas, l'on devrait relire notre deuxième paragraphe. Mais pour peu qu'on le saisisse, aussitôt il devient évident, que les rayons de la projection ne peuvent pas. être le sujet d'inhésion d'une image distincte d'eux, qu'au contraire ils forment eux-mêmes, qu'ils constituent l'image, et cela non pas efficienter mais formaliter: ils SONT l'image. Vouloir admettre une dualité absolue entre l'intellection, acte, et le verbe, habitus, nous semble donner dans l'absurdité de celui qui prétendrait suspendre une feuille de papier aux rayons d'un jet de lumière. C'est pourquoi, s'il fallait abandonner la coessentialité quod absit! nous 'hésitérions pas d'adopter pour nous-mêmes, et très resolument, l'opinion de Suarez et du Cardinal Mercier la négation de toute distinction nous semble ici moins absurde que l'affirmation d'une distin. ction réelle quoad absolutum, inter duas qualitates.

[8] Nous comparons l'intelligence à la lampe ou à la source de lumière d'une projection lumineuse; la species impressa à la petite image qui forme et détermine la lumière, c. à. d. le film; l'intellection au foyer, à la concentration de la lumière devant la lentille; la species expressa à l'image toute de lumière qui se forme sur la toile. La toile seule n'a pas son équivalent dans la projection spirituelle, car elle n'a d'autre rôle que de rompre les rayons matériels et de les rendre visibles ainsi à nos yeux.

Cet exemple de la projection est tellement expressif, parce qu'on peut très facilement y surprendre la différence entre l'émanation pure et la véritable causalité efficiente. En effet, qu'on remplace la toile par une feuille de papier photographique, aussitôt l'image procède ad extra, et les lois ordinaires de la causalité efficiente s'appliquent de nouveau: l'image se forme lentement, et dés que la formation est terminée, la causalité doit être suspendue. L'épreuve qu'on vient de faire manifeste aussi très clairement l'unité de la lumière: ce jet de lumière, comprenant et le foyer et l'image terme, est une causalité une et indivisible, puisq'il est tout entier action sur le papier. Et pourtant, n'est-il pas clair aussi, que la procession ad extra, de la lumière au papier, est précédée d'une procession ad intra, à l'intérieur de la lumière? Nous avons donc une projection indivisible mais dont l'unité n'est pas incompatible avec l'opposition relative qui s'établit nécessairement entre les rayons qui forment l'image et l'image formée par les rayons. Ce terme de la procession ad intra n'est pas proprement un effet de la projection, mais il appartient à le définition même du jet de lumière, et celui-ci ne peut se définir dans sa simplicité, sans que l'image-terme ne soit comprise dans la définition comme élément formellement constitutif: compleri non potest sine imagine praedicta. L'image en effet n'est pas distincte des rayons qui la forment: est ipsum suum nasci. L'on entrevoit ainsi, comment l'unité de simplicité peut s'accompagner de distinction réelle mais purement relative.

L'imperfection de l'exemple consiste surtout dans ce fait, que la lumière matérielle est soumise aux lois de la quantité. La lumière qui projette et la lumière projetée se distinguent et par opposition relative et par division quantitative, encore qu'il soit impossible de déterminer le point exact où cesse la lumière active et commence la projection passive. Rien de pareil dans l'intelligence: là aucune divisibilité matérielle: pas de côté gauche, ni de côté droit. L'intellection et le verbe, étant lumière projetante et lumière projetée, mais lumière spirituelle, ne constituent donc qu'un seul accident absolument un et indivisible, comportant toutefois, à l'intérieur de lui-même, une opposition relative, qui cause nécessairement une distinction réelle mais minime.